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ABSTRACT  
 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007 - 2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
represent two of the most dangerous treats at the stability of the modern financial 
system. The consequences of these two crises translated their impulse all around the 
globe, contaminating everything in their way like falling domino pieces. This has 
revealed that the modern financial system has flows and that certain actions need to be 
implemented in order to avoid in the future these catastrophic events, and to preserve 
the stability of economy.  
 
This thesis investigates how the above mentioned crises have changed the co-movement 
and correlations between different countries and translated their consequences to other 
economies, by testing for contagion. Using an asymmetric GARCH model, the paper 
examines the evolution of the correlations between 45 major stock markets, in different 
economic states, for the period 2000 - 2014. The results reveal that during the Global 
Financial Crisis the correlations between individual stock markets and the global stock 
index increased significantly, resulting in contagion at the level of the majority of 
countries included in the analysis. After the crisis, the correlation levels tend to 
decrease. However, when compared to the pre-crisis level, values are considerably 
higher, suggesting that the global stock market is becoming more and more integrated, 
and that there may still be some contagion left in the markets. The results for the 
European Sovereign Debt crisis suggest that every member of the group felt the 
consequences but in different measure. The crisis originated at the periphery, and then 
gradually shifted to the core.  
  
KEYWORDS: Contagion, correlation, co-movement, crisis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Economy has always been an uncertain phenomenon, incorporating periods of stability, 
ascending evolution, and positive market sentiment on one hand, and upward volatility, 
distress and dramatic losses on the other hand. The objective of each investor is to 
create such a portfolio that will maximize his wealth, while keeping the level of 
exposure to uncertainty and risk at minimal values. Recently, thanks to the so called 
globalization phenomenon, the set of tools and methods for immunizing investor's 
portfolio has been broadened with one more: international portfolio diversification. 
Now, companies as well as individual investors have the possibility to hold stocks, 
bonds or financial derivatives of companies from foreign countries, or to take a direct 
piece of an international company by merging or acquiring it. Moreover, the 
diversification options go further, allowing investing also in foreign government bonds, 
limiting in this way the exposure of the portfolio to that country's specific level of risk.  
 
However, thanks to the above mentioned phenomenon, the level of integration between 
economies and countries in general has started to increase. Now, the national economies 
are becoming more and more regional, while at their turn regional economies are 
evolving into global economies. According to the publication "Mergers & Acquisitions 
Review Financial Advisors First Half 2014" by Thomson Reuters, the total volume of 
global Mergers & Acquisitions for the first half of 2014 increased by more than 73%, 
registering the strongest first half for worldwide deal making since 2007 when 
compared to the same period of the last year, which means that the correlation 
coefficient of financial integration between countries is increasing year by year. This 
phenomenon is beneficial for investors and countries in general as individual entities in 
good times, but extremely dangerous in crisis periods because a higher degree of 
correlation between countries, markets and investments represents a higher degree of 
contagion and risk transferring  from one country to another when there is a crisis 
happening. And this proved to be true in 2007, when what seemed to be a small local 
problem degenerated extremely quickly in a global crisis, transferring its consequences 
from one economy to another, from one local market to an international one. 
 
 The failure of Lehman Brothers, one of the biggest financial firms in the USA with an 
international exposure, represented the first fallen domino piece which translated its 
impulse to other countries, and other economies thanks to the existing linkages between 
them. The severity of the contagion was different from country to country, those who 
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had stronger interdependencies with an economy affected by the crisis had suffered at 
their turn. Baur (2012), Kenourgios & Dimitriou (2015), Dimitriou et all. (2013), Fry-
McKibbin, Martin & Tang (2014) show that the consequences of the Global Financial 
Crisis were felt not just at the level of US but also at the level of smaller and less 
developed countries. Contagion was registered in a large number of global and local 
economies.  
 
This showed that each country's economy cannot be anymore treated and analyzed just 
as an individual and separate player; it has to be treated as a whole entity. In order to get 
a complete picture it is necessary to extend the natural and financial borders; it is 
necessary to take into consideration the linkages between countries and their economies, 
no matter if these are financial linkages or trade linkages. It is necessary to analyze this 
"network" and see where the weak points are; how the contagion does spread around, 
and how it can be avoided in the future.  
 
Recently this subject has started to gain a significant attention from academic 
researchers. Attention has been concentrated on the linkages between countries, on the 
evolution of the degree of correlation between local and global economies, as well as 
how the financial contagion resulted from the explosion of the financial bubble in the 
USA translated its impulse all around the world, contaminating everything in its way 
like a reckless virus. Moshirian (2011) analyzes the relationship between the financial 
crisis and regulations, Guo, Chen & Huang (2011) study the correlation between 
different markets and how vulnerable are they to different shocks, Aloui, Aissa & 
Nguyen (2011) evaluate the effects that the global financial crisis had on emerging 
markets, while Kenourgios, Samitas & Paltdalidis (2011) focus their attention on BRIC 
markets.  However, previous literature focuses its attention mainly on the immediate 
impact of the crisis on the global and local economies, while its long term impact and 
recovery period is left on the dark. Therefore, this paper comes as a completion of 
previous studies regarding the co-movement between countries and the post-crisis 
economic situation. 
 
The Global Financial Crisis has revealed that the global financial system is still 
vulnerable and its foundations weak and that linkages and correlations between 
economies need to be studied and quantified in order to better protect the investment, or 
taking a macroeconomic perspective, which measures and actions need to be 
implemented in order to limit the impact of negative shocks coming from outside.  
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1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the linkages between global economies before the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, during the crisis, and after the crisis. It tends to 
evaluate the level of interdependencies between countries; how interconnected and 
integrated are they at the level of their economies; what happened during the financial 
crisis; which countries where affected the most, and from which direction the contagion 
started to spread. Moreover, it aims to check if after the crisis finished, the linkages 
between countries expressed in absolute value have reached the pre-crisis level, 
decreased more or there still exists some unidentified contagion.  
 
From the perspective of European Union countries linkages, the paper aims to 
investigate the level of economic dependencies between the members, and to quantify 
the impact of financial crisis on each individual country, as well as the impact of the 
European sovereign debt crisis. All in all, the paper aims to make a clear presentation of 
the impact of crises on the economic stability of countries and how the contagion 
transfers from one economy to another.  
 
 
1.2. Hypotheses 
 
The primary interest of this thesis is to investigate the linkages between countries and 
the impact of the financial crisis on these relationships, which yields the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H01: The relationship between a country's stock market and world portfolio of stocks in 
the crisis period is higher than in normal periods: contagion. 
 
Previous research papers (Baur 2012; Chevallier 2012; Grammatikos & Vermeulen 
2012; Dovern & Roye 2014) reveal that during a crisis the relationship between 
countries tends to increase in value and economies to co-move in the same direction. As 
a result, the diversification benefits that investors constructed their portfolios based on, 
are eliminated exactly when they are needed the most. Therefore, similar results are 
expected to be found. 
 
Moving forward, another point of interest of this paper is to analyze the level of 
dependency between countries before the crisis and after the crisis, to see if after the 
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crisis the co-movement between countries had come to its pre-crisis levels or, it is 
higher. Therefore, the second hypothesis that is going to be tested takes the following 
form: 
 
H02: The level of co-movement between economies after crisis is higher than the level 
of co-movement before the crisis.  
 
Because generally the speed of economy's recovery after a crisis is low, it is expected 
that the level of co-movement between countries after the crisis is higher, and therefore, 
evidence in favor of the second hypothesis to be found. 
 
Previous literature documents that a negative shock in a developed economy translates 
quickly its impulse to other countries. Dungey and Gajurel (2014) study the equity 
market contagion during the global financial crisis (2007 - 2009) using a latent factor 
model. The paper finds strong evidence in favor of contagion presence. The contagion 
from US explains a large amount of the variance registered at the level of stock returns 
in both advanced and emerging markets. Another paper of interest is Samarakoon 
(2011) who study the transmission of shocks and contagion between US, emerging 
markets and frontier markets. The paper reveals that at the level of emerging markets-
US there exists an important asymmetric bi-directional interdependence and contagion. 
Strong co-movements are driven in most part by US shocks whereas contagion is driven 
more by emerging market shocks. 
 
Taking the analysis at the level of European Union, this thesis aims to test the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H03: The level of co-movement between country members during the crisis is the same 
as the level of co-movement before the crisis.  
 
H04: The degree of contagion is the same for all European Union country members. 
 
Ludwig (2014), Grammatikos & Vermeulen (2012) and Claeys & Vasicek (2014) reveal 
that during the financial crisis European countries registered an increased co-movement 
with US and had suffered from contagion. Each member was affected in different 
measure and the negative impulse translated from one economy to another. 
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1.3. Intended contribution 
 
The innovative aspect that this thesis intends to bring is the triple comparison between 
countries co-movement: before the crisis, during the crisis and after the crisis. All 
research papers until now studied the period before the crisis and during the crisis, and 
none of them focused on the period after the crisis. It will be useful to see how long is 
the impact of a shock in the economy, and what is the speed of recovery for individual 
countries. Moreover, the thesis will make a synthesis of the degree of co-movement 
between all European Union countries individually. The existing research papers have 
focused only on some categories of countries while none of them divided and examined 
the European Union individually.  
 
The limitations of this thesis consist in the potential bias caused by the delimitation of 
the crisis period. Many research papers use different methods in order to delimit the 
beginning and the ending of a crisis, and from this point of view the results can be 
slightly different. In the same order of thoughts, the time period chosen for the analysis 
can limit the consistency of the results. The outcomes of the investigation can be 
different if one will use the period 1999-2012 for his analysis, and another the period 
between 2002 and 2012 because of the Dot.com crisis which happened in 2000. The 
results may lose a degree of confidence when that period is taken into consideration. 
Anyway the impact of this issue is too small to bias the result of the analysis and to put 
a shadow of doubt on it.  
 
 
1.4.  Structure of the thesis 
 
The present thesis is organized in six chapters. First chapter presents a general 
introduction about the topic, research questions and hypotheses. Chapter two presents 
the theory behind the crises: factors, channels of transmission, integration of economies. 
Chapter three and four develop a broad image about the previous literature related to the 
topic, and the methodologies used in this thesis. Chapter five reveals the results of the 
investigation and their implication. The last chapter summarizes the conclusions of the 
thesis.   
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2. CRISES - THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1. Transmission channels  
 
History has proved that bad news always spread around at a very fast speed, even when 
there seems no way for it to go around. And no exception from this proved fact is crises. 
Russian crisis, Asian crisis, Financial crisis of 2007-2009, they all started locally in a 
certain country or region but thanks to their connections with other sectors, regions, 
countries, economies, very soon exploded in size and effects, translating their negative 
impulse all around the world. This contagion and risk transferring at such a big scale is 
possible only because there are certain channels that assure, and in some cases ease the 
flow of negative news, effects and losses from one economy to another, no matter if the 
shock is coming from a developed country or a developing one.  
 
The first channel that contributes to the expansion of crises is the trade channel. When 
two economies have strong trade relationships fortified by high levels of import and 
export of goods, at the moment when one of these two members will have difficulties or 
will record an internal crisis the other one at its turn will also be affected. Worsening the 
economic situation in a developed country will cause a reduction in quantities of goods 
imported, contributing in this way to the development of a demand-supply problem in 
other countries, that at its turn can cause serious economic problems, and in the end start 
a crisis. The same situation can be expressed from the perspective of a developing 
country. If a developing country starts to register some financial or economic problems, 
than its exports of goods or raw materials to other countries will decrease, causing the 
prices in the respective countries to rise and companies to be limited in the resources 
that are so vital for their activities and survival.  
 
An argument that sustains the importance of trade channel as a primary source of crises 
spreading can serve the Claessens, Tong and Wei's (2012) paper which reveal that the 
degree of economic openness and exposure to international trade was a statistically and 
economically vital channel in the global transmission of the financial crisis. Didier, 
Hevia and Schmukler (2012) find out that those countries with a higher degree of 
economic and financial openness, with higher current account deficits and with higher 
values of domestic credit over GDP, registered higher growth collapses during the 
financial crisis. Moreover, the results suggest that on average an increase in trade 
openness of 10 percentage points of GDP is associated with a plus 0.6 percentage point 
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decrease in GDP growth during uncertain times. Gorea and Radev (2014) reveal that 
countries that have stronger trade linkages with economies that register troubles tend to 
have higher joint default probabilities.  
 
Another important channel in the shock transmissions during turbulent times is the 
financial channel, which operates through financial links that exists between accounts, 
countries and economies. A crisis in one country can reduce considerably the 
availability of financial resources for other countries by reducing the level of foreign 
investments in those countries or by directly limiting the access of foreign companies by 
including additional requirements related to liquidity, capital and quality of assets, 
which in turn affects the revenue and profitability of those companies. This represents 
the starting point of market uncertainty, asset sales and panic. Moreover, as a 
consequence of a crisis in a certain country and increased risk, investors will look to 
reallocate their resources and protect their investments. As a result, there is being 
registered an internal outflow of capital at the level of affected country and a loss at the 
level of investors manifested in unrealized profits, transfer costs, additional fees and 
psychological pain.      
 
Moving further, recently, thanks to the active globalization phenomenon and integration 
of economies, financial channel has gained additional points for its role in spreading the 
effects of a local crisis globally. International mergers and acquisitions, capital markets 
liberalization, securitization and the possibility to invest beyond national borders, have 
made the global and each country's economy in part to be interconnected in one system, 
to breathe in the same time, and whenever there is an injury to feel the pain at the level 
of all economies. And this proved to be true on 15 of September, 2008 when Lehman 
Brothers, one of the biggest players in the subprime market with an international 
exposure, filed for bankruptcy. In consequence, a wave of financial pain has been 
transmitted globally, with losses at the order of billions, bankruptcies that seemed 
impossible, and bailout programs that shook the entire financial systems and believes.  
 
Didier et al. (2012) after analyzing the transmission channels of financial crisis to other 
economies, reveal that along with trade channels financial channels played an important 
role in spreading the effects of crisis around the world. The same fact is documented by 
Yamamoto (2014) which using sign restriction vector autoregressions to study the 
transmission of US shock to Asian economies, reveals that financial shocks have a 
greater influence than trade shocks, and that these shocks become greater with respect to 
the level of economic development of the respective country.  The results show that the 
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financial shock is about 2.43 times larger than the trade shock in Korea and 2.95 times 
larger in Taiwan. In the case of European countries, Gorea et al. (2014) reveal that 
during the recent sovereign debt crisis financial linkages are an important transmission 
channel only in the case of troubled Euro periphery.  
 
Another transmission channel that played an important role during the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 is the business cycle channel. A negative business cycle shock in one 
country affects or can have a negative influence on another's country economy that is 
sensitive to the respective country. Moreover, companies that are more business-cycle-
sensitive perform worse when there is a negative shock coming from outside. A proof in 
this sense serves the Claessens et al. (2012) paper which using data for 7722 non-
financial firms in 42 countries in order to study how the financial crisis of 2007-2009 
affected firms' performance and how the shocks were propagated beyond national 
borders. They reveal that changes in profits are more pronounced for those sectors that 
are more sensitive to business cycle shocks. For example a one standard deviation 
increase in the business cycle sensitivity will reduce profits by 0.44% or 14% of the 
average decline in profit.  
 
Michaelides, Papageorgiou & Vouldis (2013) using Vector Error Correction models to 
establish the long-run equilibrium of Greek economy with the US and the rest of the 
European Union countries show that the Greek business cycles tend to be caused at least 
partly by the US business cycles, and Irish and Spanish fluctuations. In the same order 
of thoughts, Erden and Ozkan (2014) using bilateral data from 22 countries reveal that 
both trade and financial linkages have an important influence in the transmission of 
business cycles to Turkish economy. Moreover, the results show that Turkish business 
cycles are related with the business cycles of other members of European Custom 
Union.  
 
A less mentioned channel in literature but which still has a big influence in crises 
transfer between countries and economies is geographical proximity and neighbors. 
When one neighbor country starts to register problems, the other countries will also be 
affected through trade constraints, capital reduction or currency implications. As a result 
the negative wave will transfer from one country to another infecting everything in its 
way. De Gregorio and Valdes (2001) document the importance of geographical 
proximity channel, by studying the reaction of four crisis indicators in 20 countries 
during three crises: the 1982 debt crisis, the 1994 Mexican crisis, and the 1997 Asian 
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crisis. They reveal that the neighborhood effect appears to be the most important 
channel in transferring and propagation of crises along with trade channel.  
 
All in all, the crises propagation channels require additional attention from markets and 
governments in order to limit at the right time the expansion of a negative wave coming 
from a certain economy and to assure the stability of the global financial system.  
 
 
2.2. Factors causing financial crises 
 
Financial crises represent a complex phenomenon that incorporates in itself a various 
list of consequences, negative effects and financial pain. In order to understand financial 
crises, their development and ways to fight them, it is necessary to analyze the factors 
that trigger crises and how do they act. According to Mishkin, Matthews and Giuliodori 
(2013, 176-179), the factors that contribute to apparition and development of financial 
crises can be arranged in six categories: 
 
2.2.1. Asset market effects on balance sheets: 
 
The situation and quality of borrowers' balance sheets play a vital role in the economy 
and in its health. Because companies are the primary pillar of the economy and the main 
contributor to wealth accumulation, deterioration in companies' balance sheets would 
represent the first symptom and factor that trigger the development of a financial crisis.  
 
Stock market decline:  A sudden and significant decline in stock prices represents one 
of the factors that contribute to the worsening of companies' balance sheets, 
intensification of moral hazard problems and adverse selection. The decline in stock 
prices results in firm's value decline, and as a direct consequence, to a sharp decline in 
company's ability to borrow in order to maintain its activity. Moreover, the decline in 
firm's value reduces the firm's collateral and credibility that it will be able to repay its 
debt, and honor its contractual obligations. In the same order of thoughts, the stock 
market decline increases exponentially the moral hazard, as firms are now willing to 
borrow more and to be implied in risky investment opportunities because they have 
much less to lose in case of default. The stagnation in companies' activity results in 
economic stagnation and financial crises development.  
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Unanticipated decline in price levels: Price levels represent one of the ground factors 
that affect the economy. Because most of the loan contracts are standardized, with fixed 
conditions and expressed in nominal terms a drop in price levels will have severe 
implications for companies' balance sheets. One direct consequence is that it increases 
the burden of debt. Now, serving the debt is more expensive than it was before because 
companies have to pay more in loan installments. Moreover, the debt value rises while 
the value of assets remains at the same level, causing gaps between assets and debt, and 
require additional funds in order to cover these differences. At their turn, banks can 
require more capital and collateral from companies to cover their obligations. A decline 
in price levels causes financial difficulties and increases the uncertainty. 
 
Unanticipated decline in the value of the domestic currency: Thanks to the active 
globalization and securitization phenomenon, now companies can establish business 
relations with foreign companies, can invest overseas, and can diversify risk all around 
the globe. Moreover, companies as well as governments can borrow internationally and 
in a currency different than their national one. As a result, the exposure of firms and 
governments to fluctuations in domestic currency has increased significantly. When 
there is a decline in the domestic currency of a country, the companies from that country 
that issued debt in a foreign currency will find that their debt level has increased, and 
that it is more difficult to honor the obligations. Because the assets' value are expressed 
in domestic currency and debt in a foreign currency a decline in domestic currency will 
result in a decline in asset value and increase in debt, causing a gap in the balance sheet. 
This will raise the necessity of additional funds to cover the differences.  
 
On the other side the decline in domestic currency has a slightly positive impact on 
company's earnings and profits. When a company has branches in a foreign country or it 
has business relationships with a foreign country, a decline in domestic currency will 
have a positive effect on the profits registered by the company because the value of the 
translated earnings will increase proportionally with the decrease in the value of the 
domestic currency, pushing the value of company's capital up. However, this impact is 
insignificant when compared to overall effect induced by depreciation in domestic 
currency. Another proof serves the fact that governments are required to maintain 
guarantee deposits in an international currency. When there is a drop in the domestic 
currency the cost of maintaining these deposits raises, causing financial problems and 
uncertainty.  
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Asset write-downs: Stock prices declines cause deterioration in assets value and finally 
write-downs. As a result, the value of the company reduces significantly. Moreover, 
because companies are selling assets, their borrowing possibilities are decreasing as a 
consequence of limited or poor quality collateral. Moral hazard and adverse selection is 
increasing because firms that are more delinquent are more willing to borrow and to 
invest in risky projects, increasing in this way the probability of a default on their 
obligations.   
 
2.2.2. Deterioration in financial institutions' balance sheets: 
 
Financial institutions have always played an important role in the development and 
good functioning of economy, acting as major players in the financial markets. They are 
the link between individual and corporate consumers and financial markets, providing 
financial products, information and investment opportunities. Deterioration in financial 
institutions' balance sheets has major impacts on these institutions activities, and 
economy in general. Because they are the main source of capital supply, even a small 
negative change in the quality of their balance sheets cause a severe contraction in their 
capital, and as a consequence, the lending declines significantly, resulting in fewer and 
more expensive resources for companies at the level of economy. At its turn, this 
contraction in lending will result in a new contraction in companies' activity and in an 
increase in adverse selection and moral hazard. Companies with worse financial 
indicators are willing to borrow more and look for investment projects that have a 
higher rate of return but in the same time are riskier. Asymmetric information can result 
in acceptance of these projects at the expense of banks and investors.  
 
2.2.3. Banking crises: 
 
A severe enough deterioration in financial institutions balance sheets' can cause 
defaults. When big companies start to fail, fear of default can spread from one 
institution to other very quickly, even in the case of healthy ones. And this is 
significantly important for banks because the main source of financing their activities is 
represented by deposits attracted from population and companies, deposits which can be 
pulled out very quickly, triggering in this way a wave of contagion.  
 
"A bank panic is registered when multiple banks fail simultaneous" (Mishkin et al. 
2013:178). Thanks to asymmetric information in a bank panic, depositors fearing for the 
safety of their deposits and doubting the capacity of bank to honor its obligations, start 
18 
 
pulling out their deposits, causing a big outflow of capital and severe financial 
contractions. Because most of the investment activities and loans that banks get implied 
in are long term, in case of a big withdrawal of deposits banks register liquidity 
problems, and fail in case they do not inject capital quick.  Bank failures and contraction 
in lending activities decrease significantly the supply of capital to borrowers, which 
results in higher interest rates, economic stagnation, moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. These problems, at their turn, have more severe implications with a final 
result: financial contagion and psychological pain. This turned to be true in 2008, when 
the failure of Lehman Brothers translated a wave of contagion, defaults and uncertainty 
all around the world at a very fast pace.  
 
2.2.4. Increase in uncertainty:  
 
One of the most fearful events in financial markets is a dramatic increase in uncertainty, 
maybe due to the failure of a big company, inaction of the government or a stock market 
crash. The resulting uncertainty blocks the ability of market participants to solve the 
adverse selection problems. It is more difficult to differentiate bad investment projects 
from good ones, and it is hard to clearly establish the level of risk that the respective 
project implies. As a result, lenders are less willing to lend, or the lending conditions are 
extremely severe which in the end leads to a contraction in lending, investment and 
economic activity.  
 
2.2.5. Increase in interest rates: 
 
Increase in interest rates affects the economy in two ways. First, it increases the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems. When interest rates are high enough only 
individuals and companies that are involved in risky projects and are delinquent on their 
payments are willing to borrow more and to pay these excessive amounts of money 
expressed in interest. As a result, banks and other financial companies will tend to 
decrease their lending volumes and limit their credit risk, which in the end leads to 
liquidity constraints for companies and decline in investment activities. Second, 
increases in interest rates play an important role in the level of cash flows that the 
companies have at their disposal. Companies with sufficient cash flows can finance 
their investment project with internal sources, without being obliged to justify their 
decision. Therefore, when there is an increase in interest rates, the level of cash flows 
that the company has at its disposal is being diminished proportionally because the 
company has to pay more in interest now. With less cash, the company needs to attract 
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external fund from banks or other financial companies. Because of asymmetric 
information and adverse selection the companies can choose not to lend to the 
respective firm, even though it has a good risk and profitable activities. In the end 
healthy firms are capital constrained and economic activity is being pulled down, 
triggering in this way the beginning of a new crisis.  
 
2.2.6. Government fiscal imbalances:    
 
Government fiscal imbalances are an important factor that can mark the beginning of a 
financial crisis. Excess debt and a wrong fiscal policy, marked by fiscal gaps, can 
trigger the fear of impossibility to honor its obligations, and in the end default on 
government debt. This is the case of Euro Zone sovereign debt crisis that affected the 
periphery of Europe, and initiated a crisis that Europe has never seen. As a result of 
unprecedented bailouts, the level of government debt increased very vast, while the 
possibility of repaying this debt lost ground thanks to fiscal imbalances and budget 
deficits discovered at the level of national economies. In the same order of thoughts, 
fears of default can cause a currency crisis which results in a fast depreciation in 
domestic currency. The decline in the value of the national currency will result in 
balance sheet imbalances for companies that are exposed to foreign currencies, by 
having debt denominated in other currency or by investing overseas. These balance 
sheets problems lead to an increase in adverse selection problems and decline in 
economic activity.  
 
These factors can have severe implications not just for local economies but also for the 
entire financial system and concrete measures and actions need to be taken in order to 
assure the health of world economy and society development.  
 
 
2.3. Integration of economies 
 
Thanks to active globalization that is taking place and recent financial crisis, the 
international stock market integration and international stock co-movements have 
started to gain significant attention.  
 
Loh (2013), after analyzing the co-movement of 13 Asia-Pacific stock returns with that 
of European and US stock market returns, using the wavelet coherence method, reveals 
that there is consistent co-movement between the returns of the biggest Asia-Pacific 
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stock markets and that of Europe and US. Moreover this relationship tends to differ 
across time, registering high values during periods of distress and relatively lower 
values in periods with low volatility. The study also shows different results for the 
European sovereign debt crisis and US financial crisis.  
 
Graham, Kiviaho and Nikkinen (2012), using the three dimensional analysis of wavelet 
coherency to study the relationship between 22 emerging economies and US, reveal that 
there is a high degree of co-movement at relatively lower frequencies between the US 
and these emerging economies. They also find these results to differ from country to 
country. Moreover, the level of integration of these economies seems to increase after 
2006 and forward. In the same order of thoughts Baur (2012) shows that the degree of 
co-movement between economies during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 
increased statistically significantly. For some countries the value more than doubled 
(India). This increased market integration resulted in a global contagion of economies, 
the epicenter being in the USA.   
 
Dovern and Van Roye (2014), using country-specific monthly financial stress indices 
for 20 major economies, show that co-movement between the financial stress indicators 
increases during major financial crises. Moreover, the risk of large financial stress 
spillovers to an economy depends directly on its economic openness. A shock in the 
USA quickly transmits internationally, which means that smaller economies and 
markets partially depend on the information that comes from USA. Morana and Beltrati 
(2008), after analyzing the correlations between US, UK, Germany and Japan during the 
period 1973-2004, discover that the integration between these four markets tend to 
increase over time, resulting in higher co-movements in prices, returns, volatilities and 
correlations.  
 
From a European perspective, Albuquerque and Vega (2008), after analyzing the effects 
that real-time domestic and foreign news about fundamentals have on the co-movement 
between stock return of Portugal and USA, show that cross-country stock market co-
movement is unchanged when Portuguese news are released. The US public information 
affects Portuguese stock market returns, but this effect is smaller when US stock market 
returns are taken into regression. The effect that news has on the Portuguese market 
depends on the nature of the news.  
 
More proof is presented by Graham and Nikkinen (2011). The wavelet analysis used by 
authors reveals that there is a high degree of co-movement, at relatively lower 
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frequencies, between MSCI Finland and MSCI Emerging Europe, MSCI Emerging 
Latin America and MSCI Emerging Asia. From a developed stock market relationship 
perspective, the study documents a relatively high degree of co-movement between 
MSCI Finland and MSCI Europe (ex-Finland), and a relatively low frequency co-
movement between MSCI Finland and MSCI North America. Furthermore, Finnish 
stock market returns reveal low levels of co-movements with the Pacific region, and low 
co-movements of volatilities between the Finnish stock market and emerging and 
developed countries stock indices.  
 
In the same order of thoughts, Ostermark (2001) reveals that Japanese and Finnish 
markets are cointegrated, and that Japanese stock market influences Finnish economy. 
The multivariate cointegration analysis shows that Nikkei stock market has an impact 
on the error correction mechanism of the Finnish stock market.  
 
Gjika and Horvath (2013) after studying the stock market co-movements between 
Central Europe countries, using asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation 
multivariate GARCH models, reveal that correlations between stock markets in Central 
Europe are strong with respect to the euro area and that it increased after joining the 
European Union and further. As a result, the diversification benefits decreased 
proportionally leading to a necessity to move to other markets in order to decrease the 
portfolio risk.  
 
Kollias and Mylonidis (2010), after studying the level of cointegration between four 
major European markets (Germany, France, Spain and Italy), reveal that the level of 
cointegration between these markets is increasing as time passes by. Moreover, the role 
of Germany as a dominant position is documented. These findings suggest that the 
diversification benefits at the level of these markets are limited, and that policy makers 
need to coordinate actions at the level of national and community level in order to 
assure a good functioning of financial system and prevention of crises spreading. 
 
From the perspective of stock market co-movements on frontier markets, Graham et al. 
(2012) reveal that the co-movement of stock returns for these countries varies 
considerably at different time horizons. Co-movement is relatively weaker for the 
frontier markets of Central and Southeastern Europe than for the Baltic region. Overall, 
a stronger co-movement is observed for the European frontier markets with the USA 
and the three most developed markets in Europe at low frequencies (long horizons) 
compared to high frequencies (short horizons). This intensity increases during the 
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period of distress registered in 2008-2009. In the same order of thoughts, Nikkinen, 
Piljak and Aijo (2012), after studying the integration level between Baltic countries and 
the developed European stock markets during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, 
conclude that the Baltic countries were highly integrated during the crisis and that 
portfolio diversification was considerably reduced exactly when it was needed the most. 
According to their results, in the crisis period all the coefficients are statistically 
significant when using quantiles regressions and that in lower quantiles coefficients are 
higher than in highest quantiles.  
 
Guidi and Ugur (2014) study the level of cointegration between the South-Eastern stock 
markets (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey) and those of Germany, UK 
and USA.  They find out that the integration test is positive and statistically significant 
for Germany and UK but not for USA and that this cointegration relationship is time 
variant. Until mid-2008 the cointegration between South-Eastern countries and 
Germany and UK was represented by short periods of no cointegration followed by 
episodes of integration. On the other hand during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 the 
cointegration between these markets was continuous.  
 
Taking the analysis to a more advanced level Chen, Chen and Lee (2014) after studying 
the level of integration between 29 frontier markets and 14 leading markets, before and 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, reveal that the global financial crisis has a big 
impact on the level of cointegration between these markets, and that it influences the 
causality between frontier and developed markets. Moreover, the crisis not just changed 
the degree of co-movement between frontier and developed markets but also changed 
the factors that lead to financial integration.   
 
Yang, Chen, Niu and Li (2014) study the global linkages between countries using a 
sample of 26 global stock market indices during the Global Financial Crisis and 
European sovereign crisis. Their results show that the level of cointegration between 
these countries increased significantly after Lehman Brothers collapse, and further 
decreased gradually from subprime crisis to European sovereign debt crisis. During 
these two crises, the role of USA as a leading factor has diminished considerably, while 
Chinese stock markets started to co-move with other stock markets, fact which could 
not be seen before. Moreover, a new order is taking place: emerging stock markets are 
leading now the global stock markets.   
 
23 
 
In the same order of thoughts, Yunus (2013) uses the recursive cointegration technique 
in order to study the dynamic relationships between ten major equity markets from 
North America, Europe, Latin America and Asia. The results show that these major 
markets are cointegrated, the cointegration level has increased over time and that the 
recent financial crisis had a major impact on the level of cointegration.  Moreover, the 
study finds out that US, Japan, India, China, UK, Germany and US influence other 
markets contributing to the establishment of their evolution trend. Therefore, portfolio 
diversification is limited across the markets, and profitable benefits are reduced 
considerably during periods marked by global financial uncertainty and crises. Zhang 
and Li (2014), after studying the relationship between US and China, reveal that there is 
no long-run cointegration at the level of these two countries. However, they document a 
strong impact at the level of Chinese markets which is coming from US markets, and 
that the correlation between these two markets is time variant.  
 
Partial contrary results are found by Gupta and Guidi (2012), who study the 
cointegration relationship between India and Asian developed stock markets. The 
results reveal that there is no evidence of cointegration between these markets and no 
evidence in favor of long-run relationship between India and Asian developed market 
has been found. The paper finds out that a time varying correlation between markets is 
present, and that this correlation increased significantly during the last financial crisis. 
However, after the crisis finished the correlation levels returned to their normal values. 
In the same order of thoughts, Lucey and Voronkova (2008), after studying the 
relationships between Russian and other equity markets during the period 1995-2004, 
reveal that Russian equity markets remain isolated in the long run with respect to other 
international markets and that the degree of cointegration between these markets is 
relatively low.  
 
All in all, the international stock market integration and the level of co-movement 
between stock returns represent the base for modern portfolio diversification and 
necessitate a deeper analysis and further study. 
 
 
2.4. The US subprime crisis 
  
"The astonishing thing about the subprime crisis is that something so small wreaked so much 
havoc. Subprime loans started out as just a pocket of the US home loan market, then mutated 
like a virus into a crisis of global proportions" (Engel and McCoy 2011:13) 
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The financial crisis of 2007-2009, which originated in the USA, is considered one of the 
most destructive and dangerous crises that the world has ever seen after the Great 
Depression. Its consequences and effects have put the entire financial system with its 
way of functioning and structure under the question mark.  
 
It started just as a small local problem. Everybody thought that this is just a small 
turbulence that appeared in the flight to development and that very soon it will end 
without any important consequences. But it was not to be. Soon, what seemed to be a 
nobody's problem, translated into one of the biggest financial crises that the society has 
ever seen, with losses in billions of dollars, bankruptcy of many financial institutions 
which were considered the pillars of modern economy and "to big to fail" and enormous 
job losses and destroyed lives. But what are the causes? What are the factors that 
triggered this chain of events that distorted the entire world and how did it happen? 
 
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to go back in time when it all started: 
home mortgage market in the 1970's. Back then, mortgage lending activities were 
practiced mainly by banks. Banks took deposits in their portfolio and used them to 
convert into mortgage loans. The capacity of applicants to repay the loan was assessed 
by loan officers and the bank took the full hit in case the borrowers defaulted on their 
loans. The lending activity was merely conservative because of the strict regulation 
from the federal and government institutions. During this period there were imposed 
interest rates on home mortgages and some states even banned adjustable-rate 
mortgages (ARMs). These measures kept bank's lending at modest levels. But as 
nothing is forever, these restrictions soon were eliminated and banks could lend more 
and construct a new portfolio of credit products that were meant to increase the value of 
banks, and to enhance the sales of homes. This deregulation, unfortunately, is the 
starting point and the first cause of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 because banks 
started to be so innovative and inventive in their loan products that created exotic 
products which borrowers could not understand, or had small chances in understanding 
(Engel & McCoy, 2011:15). 
 
Another important factor that has accelerated exponentially the development of 
mortgage market and subprime lending is technological advances. In the past, banks 
were extremely careful in lending because they did not know exactly how to evaluate 
the risk related to that loan, and how to quantify the default risk. But with the 
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appearance of computers, they could analyze vast quantities of data in really short 
periods of time. Credit histories, loan payments and collateral were accessible to the 
loan officer just at a click distance. Moreover, the development of computing allowed 
developing models that could measure and determine the risk that borrowers would 
default. Now, it was possible to take the information regarding a specific client from 
loan application, run it trough a computer and asses the applicant's default risk and its 
eligibility for a loan. Moreover, these computer innovations made the cost of 
underwriting to be relatively small and very quick in terms of time and efforts. New 
Century Financial, one of the biggest companies in the subprime lending in that time, 
advertised on their website: "We'll give you loan answers in just 12 seconds" 
(Browning, 2007).  
 
However, these technological innovations had their dark side. One of the biggest 
problems of these models was that in order to give accurate results it had to use a very 
large set of historical data, data which for the subprime market was not available 
because of its recent development. Moreover, the bank analysts were using in their 
modeling scenarios the assumption that housing prices in the US will keep growing in 
the future which evidently was a wrong assumption. The third pitfall of computer 
modeling was that it suffered from the so called phenomenon "garbage in garbage out". 
It means that if the data or the assumptions that the analysts were using were 
inappropriate or wrong, then the results accumulated were biased and did not represent 
the reality. However, technological advances played their role in the development of the 
subprime market and in the end at the explosion of the biggest financial crisis in the 
history because it created the false image of a reliable and effective underwriting.     
 
Taking the analysis to a broader view, it can be found that macroeconomic and public 
policy factors also played an important role in the rise and development of subprime 
market. The Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in 1998 and the Dot-com bubble in 
2000 had an enormous effect on American economy, destroying people's confidence in 
the stock market. After a short period of time the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 
and the Enron's bankruptcy dropped the country into a deeper recession. Throughout 
this, the housing and subprime markets were seen as the light at the end of the tunnel 
and the authorities started to axe their influence in that direction. In 2000, the FED 
started to implement its "Greenspan put" and decreases the interest rates causing a 
steady increase in housing prices of 10 percent per year. Moreover, further the Fed 
decreased more the interest rates, fact which resulted in cheap credit and affordable 
housing investment plans (Engel & McCoy, 2011:19). In the next years the politicians 
26 
 
axed on the American spending culture and instigated population to spend more money 
and to use actively their credit cards and other financing possibilities that they have, one 
of this being mortgage debt and refinancing. Different campaigns and advertisements 
started to appear such as: "There's got to be at least $25000 hidden in your house. We 
can help find it" (CitiCorp) or "Need cash? Use your home" (Banco Popular) (Story, 
2008).  
 
In the same order of thoughts, another factor that contributed to the development of 
subprime market was the development of China and its economic boom. Thanks to the 
accelerated evolution of Chinese economy, people started to accumulate more and more 
capital, and to search investment opportunities that offer a relatively high rate of return, 
while the risk is kept under control. And here, the subprime market lending appeared as 
a gold mine for external investors. America started to register high volumes of capital 
inflows in its economy, while the levels of capital outflows were kept at the same level 
or even decreasing. These capital inflows represented an adrenaline injection into the 
subprime market, just what was needed to stimulate the housing prices, fact sustained 
and by Jagannathan, Kapoor and Schaumburg (2013). 
 
Probably, one of the factors that contributed most to the Global Financial Crisis is the 
securitization phenomenon. The idea behind the securitization process consists in taking 
a mortgage loan, transfer it to a legally remote trust, transform the monthly loan 
payments into bonds rated by rating agencies and then sell these bonds to investors. The 
bonds have as collateral the mortgage. The beginning of the securitization date back to 
the 1930s, when at the initiative of the Government to assure the availability of money 
for home mortgages was created the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae). Thirty years later the Congress divided this association and created a new 
government-sponsored entity (Freddie Mac). Later on both entities became private 
sector companies but which had to serve the shareholders and the government, being 
exempted from taxes for this. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were responsible for 
mortgage securitization process (Engel & McCoy, 2011:18).   
 
Observing the success of these two organizations investment banks and other financial 
companies also started to enter the game. Thanks to the active deregulation of this 
market niche in USA, soon financial companies started to offer a large range of 
financial products to their clients. The problem was that these products were extremely 
complicated for customer understanding. Moreover, there were so many intermediaries 
and companies that offered these products that in the process their quality diminished 
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exponentially, being also hard to value them and to asses a risk category. One of these 
products was the collateralized debt obligations or CDOs. The idea behind CDOs is that 
the company takes a bond, divides the bond into tranches and repackages them into new 
securities. Moreover, the tranches from CDOs were further divided and sold as CDOs2 
and CDOs3. The entire process can be represented by an upside down pyramid, the base 
line being represented by the initial mortgage loan and the pyramid levels by CDOs, 
CDOs2 and CDOs3. Further, banks did find out a solution to the limits of exposure of 
their balance sheets to debt. They created Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs) which 
were entities that bought the securities from the bank so that these could not appear on 
the balance sheet. In this way, banks could invest as much as they wanted in subprime 
market instruments without being required to increase their capital. The problem with 
this structure is that it is extremely unstable and can fall down in every moment, at the 
smallest shock coming from outside or inside or, when the base is losing ground. And 
this is what happened in 2007 when the value of homes started to decline; people were 
not able to repay their loans and defaulted. As a consequence the support of the pyramid 
just diminished considerably and the pyramid started to shake until it felt in pieces.  
 
One factor that should had maintained equilibrium between risk and return for these 
investment products is the rating agencies. However, this did not happen because first of 
all rating agencies did not have enough resources to handle the increased volume of 
work which in turn affected the quality of ratings. One employee from a rating agency 
stated: "Tensions are high. Just too much work, not enough people, pressure from 
company, quite a bit of turnover and no coordination of the non-deal ‘stuff’ they want 
us and our staff to do" (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008:12). 
 
The same fact 
is reflected by another employee from the same firm: “We ran our staffing model 
assuming the analysts are working 60 hours a week and we are short on resources... 
The analysts on average are working longer than this and we are burning them out. We 
have had a couple of resignations and expect more" (Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2008:12).  The second reason why rating agencies were wrong in their 
ratings is that they became interested parts in valuing subprime market products. Rating 
agency's analysts seemed to be aware of the agency interest when rating a deal. One 
proof in this sense can serve the following affirmation of an analyst from a rating 
agency: "...if you have not done so please send me any updates to fees on your 
transactions for this month. It is your responsibility to look at the deal list and see what 
your deals are currently listed at" (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008:25). 
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Finally, one factor that maybe not contributed directly to the financial crisis 
development but which certainly had a major role in its formation is the companies' 
greed and desire for more and more market share and bigger profits.  At the end of 
twentieth century, US investment banks became so big and multinational that soon their 
investment opportunities wiped out or did not meet their expectations. Moreover, the 
strong competition between biggest bank players accentuated the necessity for finding 
new investment opportunities and market niches that can offer important gains in terms 
of clients and revenues in order to beat the competition. As a result, the banks started to 
compete into a blind race for revenues, a race in which rules could be adopted to their 
needs and where supervision was limited. And the solution was seen to be in the 
subprime mortgage market, which was at its boom in that time, and which offered 
unprecedented gains and ways to register revenues.  
 
This was the beginning of a period of financial innovations, easing credit conditions and 
active search of new potential clients, search which soon became so fierce that evolved 
into a predatory lending activity. The predatory lending activity consisted in trying to 
get as much clients as possible by sending different offers, meeting with potential 
clients and convincing them to take a loan or refinance. Banks and other investment 
companies were hiring the so called "cold callers" who were responsible for just calling 
random people and offering their services and trying to convince them to refinance, 
often using different "dirty" methods. An inside information about these practices was 
revealed by a former finance company employee who stated: "Finance companies try to 
do business with blue-collar workers, people who have not gone to college, older people 
who are on fixed incomes, non English-speaking people, and people who have 
significant equity in their homes. In fact, my perfect customer would be an uneducated 
widow who is on a fixed income, hopefully from her deceased husband's pension and 
Social Security, who has her house paid off, is living off of credit cards, but having a 
difficult time keeping up with her payments and who must make a car payment in 
addition to her credit card payments..." (Dough, 1998:31) and "Our entire sale is built 
on confusion. Blue-collar workers tend to be less educated. I know I am being very 
stereotypical, but they are the more unsophisticated. They can be confused in the loan 
closings, and they look to us as professionals"(Dough, 1998:35). Moreover, the bank 
employees targeted as a potential category of clients those who were delinquent in their 
loan payments, fact which reduced considerably the chances that the client will pay its 
loan installments or that it will not default on his loan.   
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The problem with these practices is that people who did not need to take a mortgage or 
to refinance did it. And this happened at a very high price because banks used to include 
high fees into the contract or sky rocket interest on loans, the main reasons being the 
fact that clients were missing the knowledge about the housing market or did not know 
that they could get a loan somewhere else at a lower price. An example in this sense can 
serve the case of Eller Guyton who got an interest rate for her house in Southern 
Baltimore in October 1997 that was approximately twice the market rate even though 
she had "A" credit rating, the highest possible (Rath, 2000).  
 
Another proof of interest, which shows that financial companies were intentionally 
misleading people in their financial necessities or loan terms choices, is the following 
statement that comes from an insider source: "To flip one of these small loans into a 
personal or home equity loan, we were trained to sell the monthly "savings"-that is, how 
much less per month the customer would be paying off if we flipped the loan. In reality, 
the "savings" that we were trained to sell to the customers were just an illusion. The 
uneducated customer would jump for the "savings," thinking that he would have more 
money to buy other things. What the customer would not figure out, and what we would 
not tell him, is that he would be paying for a longer period of time and, in the end, 
would pay a whole lot more" (Dough, 1998:31-32). Thanks to these practices, people 
were taking loans in excess and over their possibilities to return them, fact which led to 
a formation of a financial bubble that finally exploded in one of the most dangerous and 
damaging crises that the world has seen since the Great Depression.  
 
The first signs of financial troubles started to appear at the end of 2006, when two large 
mortgage lenders, Ownit Mortgage Solutions and Sebring Capital Partners LP, started to 
register problems with their mortgage loans. In a short period of time both of them were 
bankrupt (Engel & McCoy, 2011:69). Since then, many other companies started to feel 
the shocks coming from the subprime market and the situation started to get worse. 
Prices on houses started to decline sharply and many borrowers defaulted on their loans. 
The situation was far more than worse because with the housing prices down it was 
impossible to sell them and to cover the losses and even though some of them could be 
sold their value did not cover the gaps. As a result, in June 2007 two Bear Stern 
Subprime hedge funds sank, and it was clear that the company has bought a one way 
ticket. Meanwhile, the biggest insurance company AIG, that had a big portfolio of credit 
default swaps started to shake. The problems that the company was dealing with were 
that the value of swaps might go down forcing the company to register major write 
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downs and the other is that its counterparties might require additional guarantees to 
back of its obligations. 
 
But the worst part was just coming up. Lehman Brothers, one of the biggest players in 
the mortgage market, started to register considerable losses and to shake. Its toxic assets 
started to eat the capital that the bank had at a very fast rate leaving the bank in a 
deplorable situation. Moreover, the fact that the company refused to sell its bad assets or 
to raise more capital, when the situation started to get worse at the end of 2007, because 
did not want to dilute shareholders' value, had disastrous effects on the company's 
balance sheet. Meanwhile investors were anxious and started to put bets against Lehman 
which aggravated the situation more. The bank was looking for a buyer. It went to 
Warren Buffet and Bank of America but the deals were not closed because government 
representatives said that they will not support closing of the deal. In this time the stock 
price was registering record low levels. Barclays was ready to step in being the saving 
anchor for Lehman but because Federal Reserve declined to back up the firm's assets, 
Barclays stepped out from the game. (Engel & McKoy, 2011:103) As a result on 
September 15, 2008 Lehman filed for bankruptcy this being the biggest bankruptcy in 
the US history. The effects started to translate very quickly to other market participants 
such as insurance companies that sold credit default swaps on Lehman's debt.  
 
The markets were in a panic not seen in a very long time and the flu that couple of days 
ago seemed just a small cold, quickly degenerated into a virus that contaminated 
everything in its way, and did not seem to stop just in America. Soon the effects of 
Lehman Brother's collapse were visible in different areas and markets with billions in 
write-downs and multiple rescue packages from the government in order to protect the 
economy and to stop the crisis going deeper and deeper, until it cannot be saved 
anymore. This crisis has revealed again that the modern financial system has a lot of 
flaws and that a more severe regulation is needed not just at the structural level but also 
at the psychological level, in order to avoid in the future a disastrous déjà-vu. It is 
required a more severe discipline from the side or market participants and especially 
from market makers who have the responsibility and the obligation to construct and to 
maintain a healthy and ethical financial system.     
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2.5. The Euro Zone sovereign debt crisis 
 
The Euro Zone sovereign debt crisis represents one of the most dangerous attacks on the 
Euro Zone stability and integrity as a whole unit.  Its roots back down into the financial 
crisis of 2007, which started in the US and expanded very quickly globally translating a 
wave of negative losses and instability to other economies and countries. Euro Zone was 
no exception thanks to the fact that European countries have had a strong connection 
with US in terms of trade and financial linkages. Moreover, the increased level of 
exposure that Europe's banks had in subprime market increased exponentially the 
translation of risk and losses from USA to Euro Area, pushing the economy and its 
active members in trouble, and further into recession. But the real origin of the problem 
is related to the country members' fiscal indiscipline and lack of proper regulation at the 
level of entire European Union. Joining the euro for some countries was equivalent to 
an open door to a considerably cheaper source of financing and lower interest rates fact 
explained by Figure 1: 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of interest rates for European Union countries. (European Central 
Bank). 
 
 
As it can be seen, after joining the European Union these countries' interest rates fell 
close to the interest level of Germany, fact which made local governments to realize 
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soon that their debt burden has lost ground, and that they can afford to borrow more and 
more, without facing any constraints or visible problems, at least at that time. Soon, the 
debt level in the southern European countries and Ireland started to reach high levels. 
Companies started to invest more and more, to engage in diverse investment 
opportunities and to expand exponentially, being propelled by cheap bank loans and 
advantageous credit conditions. Moreover, after seeing the gains and rate of return that 
mortgage market was offering to companies in USA, investment banks from Europe 
started to get involved more and more in the subprime market and to increase their' 
balance sheet exposure to mortgage loans and their derivatives.  The governments and 
companies were so attracted by revenues and cheap credit that went on a lending fever 
which increased artificially the home prices and in the end turned out into a credit 
boom.  
 
The burning point erupted when the financial crisis in the USA started to expand at 
unprecedented levels with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. From that moment, 
banks started to register losses on their subprime market instruments, as the value of 
houses started to decline sharply and borrowers to default on their loans. The assets that 
not a long time ago were bringing an astonishing revenue for banks and other financial 
companies now started to became toxic. The necessity of asset write downs was 
imminent. As a result the lending activity started to decrease and the interest rates to 
increase exponentially. Economic activity was stopped when was needed the most. 
However, the problems did not end there. Moral hazard and information asymmetry 
played their role again. Firms that were in a bad situation and knew that in case of 
default will walk away, started to search actively for credit supplies, while those with 
the lowest probability to default considered the interest rate to expensive. As a 
consequence, delinquent firms started to borrow even at high interest rates, contributing 
in this way to the worsening of the economic situation.       
 
The worst was still to come. On October, 2009 the newly elected government of Greece 
made a statement that shocked the entire Euro area. It was stated that the previous 
Hellenic government has mislead its Euro zone neighbors by presenting false numbers 
in what concerns the macroeconomic situation in Greece. The public deficit was 12.7% 
or with 7.6% higher than the presented forecasted value (Katsimi & Moutos, 2010). As 
a consequence of this statement, the situation started to aggravate. Investors as well as 
rating agencies started to doubt the capacity of Greece to repay its obligations. The 
sovereign CDS spreads and bond yields started to sky rocket, and to register 
considerably higher values when compared with those for Germany. On January 8, 2010 
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when the European Commission condemned Greece for presenting false data, the spread 
rose by 170 basis points and reached approximately 400 basis points (Kosmidou, 
Kousenidis & Negakis, 2014). Moreover, rating agencies downgraded the Greek 
government bonds pushing Greece into a deeper recession. The crisis has just begun as 
the contagion started to spread and other countries registered the same problems. Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland and later Italy were in the same situation with a debt level that was 
more than anyone expected.  
 
Some immediate actions were required. The broken leg of European Union had or to be 
treated or amputated. By entering the European Union Greece, as well as the other 
members, gave up the possibility to use two main tools in order to adjust its economy to 
shocks. It lost the right to establish its own monetary policy and to change the nominal 
exchange rate of its currency (Gibson, Hall & Tavlas, 2012). Therefore, these countries 
required assistance and liquidity injections from outside. According to European Central 
Bank (2013) between 2010 and 2012 Portugal, Greece and Ireland received financial 
assistance from European Union and International Monetary Fund. In order to ease to 
economic situation in Greece members or European Union agreed to assist Greece 
financially in form of a bailout program. Initially a 3 year 110 billion Euros plan formed 
with the participation of European Union, International Monetary Fund and European 
Central Bank was adopted on May 2nd, 2010. In turn, Greece agreed to an 
unprecedented austerity plan. However, this rescue package was not received with 
enthusiasm by markets and another bailout was required. Therefore on July 21, 2011 the 
Council of Europe agreed to another rescue package for Greece summing up a 109 
billion Euros from EA countries and a write off of 50% of Greek government debt. The 
implementation of this plan was registering some impediments from Greece but soon 
the situation started to improve when the Greek government announced that it will buy 
back some issued bonds at a price higher than market expectations. Market tension 
started to ease and rating agencies upgraded Greece's rating (Kosmidou et al., 2014). A 
visual representation of Euro crisis can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Many economists say that European Union has made a big mistake by injecting so much 
money into Greece's recovery at the expense of taxpayers and that it should exclude it 
from its list, while others think that the last action will have more severe implications in 
the future than bailing out Greece now. It is hard to find a middle ground position 
regarding this issue so probably in this case time is a better judge and it will show at the 
right moment.  
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Figure 2: Evolution of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. (Source: Mishkin, 
Matthews & Giuliodori, 2013:198). 
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3. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH  
 
 
The macroeconomic and financial linkages between countries, as well as risk 
transferring, have started to be analyzed in detail by a lot of studies, especially after the 
financial crisis of 2007 - 2009. Baur (2012), after analyzing 25 countries and ten sectors 
for the period October 1979 - October 2009, reveals that the degree of co-movement 
between countries during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 increased significantly, 
resulting in a rapid risk transferring between economies and a severe contagion. In some 
cases, the degree of co-movement can more than double in the crisis period, this being 
the case of India. In normal times, its financial market is moderately linked with the 
global financial sector (0.3650), while in the crisis period the linkage increases 
significantly (1.1593). On the other way, for some countries the relationship takes an 
opposite sign. If in normal times it is positively correlated with the global market then 
during the crisis the respective correlation is becoming negative. This is the case of New 
Zeeland which in normal times it has a degree of co-movement equal to 0.3384 while in 
the crisis period the value is changing to -0.1330, the result being statistically significant 
at 1% level. The same results are revealed when analyzing the relationships between 
countries through the prism of sectors. The lowest degree of contagion is registered in 
emerging markets which means that they are less exposed to the global financial system 
than developed markets.  
 
Similar results are revealed by Dovern and Roye (2014). They take a slightly different 
approach when modeling and measuring the dependencies between economies. The 
model used to measure the degree of co-movement of financial stress is based on six 
indicators: stock market volatility, exchange rate volatility, stock market returns, 
government bond volatility, banking sector volatility, and money market volatility. This 
approach allows identifying the magnitude of the impact of the crisis and the channels 
through which the contagion is transferred from one country to another. The results 
show that the financial spillovers are going from developed countries to emerging ones, 
and depend on the degree of economic and financial openness of that country. 
Moreover, when using a GVAR model to simulate a potential shock in the economy the 
results show that the direction of contagion is from developed economies to emerging 
ones and depends on the degree of openness of the last ones.  
 
Another proof of interest in this sense is presented by Chevallier (2012). After using 
multivariate Markov switching models the author reveals that global imbalances stand 
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at the core of the financial crisis and that they are impacted by the changing market 
conditions in the credit and commodity markets. Moreover, the results show that the 
epicenter of the financial crisis was the USA housing and mortgage markets.  
 
Taking the analysis to a European angle, it is found that the results are approximately 
similar to those exposed above. Castren, Dees & Zaher (2010), after studying the 
relationship between euro area corporate default probabilities and macroeconomic 
fluctuations and macro-financial shocks through the prism of a GVAR model, show that 
the Expected Default Frequencies in the euro area react to shocks which come from 
GDP, euro/US dollar exchange rate, equity prices and oil prices. Moreover, the findings 
reveal that the euro area firms are more sensitive to shocks to global GDP compared to 
shocks to the euro area and US GDP.   
 
Grammatikos & Vermeulen (2012), after dividing their sample of observations in three 
country group categories: North, South and Small in order to study the impact of 
financial and sovereign debt crises on the performance of European countries, reveal 
that there is a statistically significant evidence of crisis transmission to European non-
financials from US non-financials, while the financials are inconsistent in this case. In 
what concerns the sovereign debt crisis, the results show that financials depend more on 
changes in the difference between the Greek and German CDS spreads after Lehman 
Brothers' collapse compared to the period before the collapse.  
 
Ludwig (2014) studies the presence of wake-up and pure contagion in the Euro area. 
The results attest the presence of pure sovereign contagion in the Eurozone and an 
increasing risk aversion via Eurozone countries since May 2010. However, the pure 
sovereign contagion is time variant, its intensity decreasing since its peak in 2010. 
Evidence that the crisis started at the periphery of Eurozone is found. In the same order 
of thoughts Fong & Wong (2012), after using CoVar methodology to study the 
sovereign relationships between European Union countries, reveal that Greece is the 
most vulnerable country in terms of sovereign default followed by Portugal. The value 
registered by Greece's ΔCoVar is 46 basis points, Portugal's 44 basis points, Ireland's 27 
basis points and Italy and Spain 18 and 14 basis points respectively. Finland and 
Germany have the lowest values of ΔCoVar: 2 and 3 basis points. From the point of 
view of spillover effects the paper finds out that Greece has a big impact on Portugal 
and Ireland but not on Spain and Italy and this relationship is not symmetrical. For 
example, when Greece is under stress, Italy's ΔCoVar at the 99th percentile is 4 basis 
points, while when Italy is under stress the Greece's ΔCoVar at the 99th percentile will 
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be 80 basis points. These results have important implications for policy makers, 
suggesting the direction and intensity of their measures in order to reduce the contagion 
and to start the recovery.  
 
Gomez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) take a different approach in their analysis. In 
order to study the existence of contagion between countries during the sovereign debt 
crisis they use daily data of 10-year bond yields for 11 Eurozone countries, both central 
and peripheral. The results show that during the crisis there are new causality patterns 
that occur between countries which were absent before the crisis started. Moreover, the 
paper reveals an increase in causality in more than 70% of the cases, fact which 
suggests that there is a high degree of contagion between countries, most of it coming 
from peripheral countries. However, this paper shows that an intensification of 
relationships is registered not only within peripheral countries but also with other 
central countries such as Germany and France. This means that contagion can spread 
not only from peripheral countries to peripheral countries but also to central Eurozone 
countries that have a big exposure in those countries debt.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Causal relationships from EMU peripheral countries. a: Causal relationships 
from EMU peripheral to central countries. b: Causal relationships within EMU 
peripheral countries. (Gomez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero 2014:23) 
 
 
From Figure 3 and 4 it can be seen that the number of relationships between peripheral 
and central Eurozone countries multiplies considerable, proving the fact that during the 
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crisis the linkages between countries are increasing exponentially, leading to an ease in 
contagion spreading within peripheral countries and from peripheral countries to central 
EMU countries.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Causal relationships from EMU central countries. a: Causal relationships 
from EMU central to peripheral countries. b: Causal relationships within EMU central 
countries. (Gomez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2014:24). 
 
 
Li and Zhu (2014), after studying the evolution of the level of co-movement between 
five Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand), G7 countries 
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US) and four Latin American countries 
(Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile) during the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2007 financial 
crisis, find out that there exist a significant increase in market co-movements and the 
test for international financial contagion, coming from these two crises, is positive. The 
paper presents proofs that the East Asian Crisis increased the linkages between Hong 
Kong and a big number of Asian countries, Latin American countries and G7 countries, 
resulting in contagion at the level of these countries' markets. However, when 
comparing the 2007 financial crisis with East Asian crisis, the paper finds out less 
evidence of financial contagion in Asian countries and Latin American coming from the 
Global Financial Crisis. However, this is not true for G7 countries. The linkages 
between this group of countries and US increased dramatically during the 2007 financial 
crisis, resulting in a high level of contagion, with the epicenter being in US.  
Another proof of interest is presented by Claeys & Vasicek (2014) who, after studying 
the linkages between 16 EU sovereign debt markets using a factor augmented version of 
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the VAR model and multivariate structural break test, reveal important spillovers, with 
Belgium, Italy and Spain being the central markets during the financial crisis. The 
results show that the total contagion on 16 EU bond markets is approximately equal to 
59% meaning that shocks to bonds in other countries have a huge impact on sovereign 
bond spreads. The other 41% in variation are caused by domestic factors. The paper 
identifies three groups of countries with respect to strength in their bilateral contagion: 
(I) the core Eurozone (Austria, Finland, France, Netherlands) where domestic factors 
play an insignificant role; (II) Portugal, Ireland and Greece, where domestic variations 
are more important than bilateral ones and (III) Belgium, Italy and Spain who register 
important mutual effects, receiving and transferring shocks to all Eurozone markets.  
 
Miyasuyoshi, Takahashi, Shimada & Tsukuda (2014) analyze the contagion from USA 
during the financial crisis of 2007 using a bivariate EGARCH model. The paper 
investigates the daily data on bond risk premiums for the financial and manufacturing 
industries. The results show that the risk premium for 5-year bonds issued by 
manufacturing industry companies is affected from a constant shock coming from 
foreign industries. The 5-year maturity bond risk for the manufacturing industry is 
sensitive to the foreign risk at the 5% level of significance, meaning that foreign shocks 
transmit directly into the Japanese manufacturing industry. Specific for the Japanese 
economy is that shocks translate from manufacturing industry into financial sector, even 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and not the other way as in the case of USA.  
 
Chen, Wei, Zhang & Yu (2014), after studying the relationship between USA and China 
during the Global Financial Crisis using various modern econometric techniques, reveal 
that there was an increased contagion during the crisis translating from USA into the 
Chinese economy. The time-varying lower Kendall's τ registered during the period of 
financial crisis is about 1.87 times the value of that registered in a non-crisis period in 
average. This means that the spillovers increased during the crisis with approximately 
87%, resulting in a high degree of translation of negative effects from USA into the 
Chinese economy.  
 
Moving forward, Hui & Chan (2014) study the presence of contagion between real 
estate and equity markets during the financial crisis for Hong Kong, US and UK. Using 
coskewness and cokurtosis tests, they register a statistically significant proof of 
contagion between equity and real estate markets in both directions, the contagion 
between US's equity and real estate markets being the most significant. Countries with 
weaker economy and financial conditions are more exposed and have bigger chances of 
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contagion meaning that investors should analyze carefully the decision to invest in a 
certain country and evaluate the potential implications in case of a crisis. The same is 
true for policy makers because of the rapidity and quality of their measures depend the 
level of contagion that the respective country will register. 
 
Dungey and Gajurel (2014) study the equity market contagion during the global 
financial crisis (2007 - 2009) using a latent factor model. The paper finds strong 
evidence in favor of contagion presence. The contagion from US explains a large 
amount of the variance registered at the level of stock returns in both advanced and 
emerging markets. The results show that the contagion coming from US accounts and 
explains about 73 percent of the volatility registered at the level of French equity 
markets; 77 and 65 percent at the level of German and British equity markets. Japan 
registered the lowest level of contagion among developed countries - only 19 percent. 
From the point of view of emerging markets US crisis had a small impact in the stock 
return volatility of these countries except Brazil. US crisis accounts for 21 percent in the 
Brazil's stock market volatility. The authors affirm that contagion effects are not 
strongly correlated with the level of global integration.   
 
Another paper that analyzes the volatility transmission between stock markets is Jung 
and Maderitsch (2014). Using intra-daily data and a Heterogeneous Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag Model, the authors find evidence of market synchronization in what 
concerns the volatility. The volatility from Hong Kong is sensible to volatility coming 
from trading in US, while Europe's volatility spillovers seem to be insignificant. 
However the volatility coming from Hong Kong directly affects European markets. 
Europe has a positive significant effect on US markets' volatility.  During the crisis the 
volatility spillovers register record high levels in all markets. However, after taking 
account of conditional heteroskedasticity in their models the authors do not find 
evidence of market contagion, only interdependence. 
 
Chang and Chen (2014) take a slightly different approach in measuring contagion. They 
analyze the presence of contagion in global REITs returns over 2006-2010 applying a 
correlation coefficient analysis for 16 countries' daily REITs indices. The results 
suggest the presence of clear evidence of contagion in global REITs markets. Moreover, 
the REITs markets from Europe suffer more from contagion than those from Asia. The 
99.9% VAR estimates of European and Asian countries are 13.19% and respectively 
19.81%. During the crisis the average values increase to 35.52% and 38.82% 
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respectively, proving the fact that European REITs are more affected by contagion 
during the period 2006-2010.  
 
Choudhry and Jayasekera (2014) study the leverage and spillover effects between 
banking institutions' stock markets of the biggest economies (Germany, UK and US) 
and PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) during the Global 
Financial Crisis. The results show that the crisis intensified the volatility spillovers 
between the major economies and PIIGS countries, big movements coming from 
Germany, UK and US. The relationship during pre-crisis was unidirectional and 
asymmetric: from major economies to the European distressed countries.  However the 
crisis changed the situation, evidence of spillovers coming from smaller European 
economies to major economies being found, the countries most affected being Germany 
and UK. The results support the hypothesis that during the crisis contagion has 
expanded from one country to another like a virus. 
 
Different results are found by Morales and Andreosso-O'Callaghan (2014) who, after 
studying the effects of the financial crisis at the global and regional level using different 
econometric methods, reveal that there is no contagion in the markets, not in a regional 
or global form. There are just spillover effects coming from USA.  
 
Another paper of interest is Samarakoon (2011) who study the transmission of shocks 
and contagion between US, emerging markets and frontier markets. The paper reveals 
that at the level of emerging markets-US exists an important asymmetric bi-directional 
interdependence and contagion. Strong co-movements are driven in most part by US 
shocks whereas contagion is driven more by emerging market shocks. In what concerns 
the contagion effect coming from US except Latin America no proof is found that 
contagion spreads from US to emerging markets. From the perspective of frontier 
markets, the paper shows that there is a small, when expressed in magnitude, 
interdependence and contagion in frontier markets with respect to US shocks. Frontier 
markets are affected more during turbulent times, the level of contagion increasing 
exponentially with market turmoil. The financial crisis of 2007 affected more in terms 
of contagion than emerging markets.   
 
Continuing the idea of the previous paragraph, Bekiros (2014) study the relationships 
existent between US, EU and BRICS countries. The results confirm that the integration 
level between almost all countries included in the analysis has increased after the Global 
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Financial Crisis and Euro Sovereign debt crisis. Countries tested positive for contagion 
while evidences in favor of the "decoupling" phenomenon have not been found.  
 
All in all, crises represent an incontrollable phenomenon, and in order to minimize the 
potential impact that it can cause it needs to be studied and quantified from all aspects 
and from all points of view.   
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
 
4.1. Data 
 
In order to establish the macroeconomic relationships and interdependencies between 
economies it is necessary to make a clear distinction between a crisis period and a 
period of economic stability. Moreover, it is vital to identify as accurate as possible the 
beginning and the ending of the respective crisis. In order to identify the starting and 
ending point of the Global Financial Crisis this thesis uses the results presented in Baur 
(2012). According to this paper, the author first of all identifies a relatively long crisis 
period according to all major financial and economic news related to the Global 
Financial Crisis. The next step consists in modeling the excess volatility registered in 
the market as a benchmark to identify the start and the end date of the Global Financial 
Crisis. Because it is a unanimous opinion that the crisis originated in the financial 
sector, the conditional volatility is estimated using an asymmetric GARCH model based 
on the global financial sector returns. By combining these two methods, the author 
reveals that the beginning of the financial crisis is August 2007 and its ending is March 
2009. Therefore this paper assumes the beginning of the crisis being August 2007 and 
its ending March 2009.  
 
The data used in this analysis contains weekly prices of aggregate stock indices for 45 
countries expressed in local currency in order to analyze the transmission of the crisis in 
the financial sector to the real sector at the global level. In order to analyze the 
interdependencies at the European Union level, data regarding CDS spreads for 28 
member states is used. The data is obtained from Thomson Financial (Datastream). The 
analysis uses weekly data in order to avoid the potential bias caused by the differences 
in trading time across countries. The data covers a 14-year period from January 2000 
until September 2014.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics - the period before the crisis 
 
 
Table 1 reveals that before the Global Financial Crisis almost all countries included in 
the analysis registered a positive mean stock market return. Developing countries tend 
to record higher returns when compared to developed market, which is line with the 
theory that markets which bear more risk should offer a higher return to compensate for 
the potential losses that the investor can suffer, and to make him willing to take the risk. 
Just couple of countries registered a negative mean stock return: Japan, Finland, 
Netherlands, Greece, and Italy.   
Country 
Before the crisis 
Mean 
return  Median Maxim Minim Std. Dev. Kurtosis Skewness No. Obs. 
Australia 0.0018 0.0029 0.0461 -0.0562 0.0145 0.8321 -0.4181 395 
New Zeeland 0.0016 0.0025 0.0537 -0.0892 0.0155 3.6013 -0.7652 342 
Brazil 0.0031 0.0083 0.1618 -0.1248 0.0364 1.0076 -0.1277 395 
Mexico 0.0037 0.0060 0.1169 -0.0960 0.0313 1.2120 -0.2490 395 
Canada 0.0013 0.0018 0.0780 -0.1003 0.0214 1.8060 -0.4924 395 
USA 0.0001 0.0004 0.1018 -0.0784 0.0225 2.4370 0.1784 395 
Chile 0.0027 0.0036 0.0551 -0.0522 0.0158 0.9000 -0.1881 395 
China 0.0029 0.0029 0.1280 -0.0754 0.0302 0.8060 0.2970 395 
Hong Kong 0.0009 0.0028 0.0775 -0.1421 0.0282 1.6368 -0.5633 395 
Indonesia 0.0032 0.0071 0.0894 -0.1010 0.0310 0.7362 -0.5666 395 
Korea 0.0017 0.0045 0.1168 -0.1488 0.0376 0.8538 -0.3758 395 
Taiwan 0.0004 0.0041 0.1176 -0.1161 0.0362 1.0890 -0.3048 395 
Thailand 0.0015 0.0033 0.0860 -0.1403 0.0324 0.6934 -0.3122 395 
India 0.0030 0.0080 0.1213 -0.1682 0.0389 2.7546 -1.0990 395 
Japan -0.0001 0.0026 0.1011 -0.0979 0.0285 0.7885 -0.2312 395 
Russia 0.0067 0.0111 0.1951 -0.2279 0.0492 2.3224 -0.4908 395 
South Africa 0.0032 0.0058 0.0976 -0.1030 0.0266 1.2907 -0.3268 395 
Austria 0.0035 0.0050 0.0550 -0.0947 0.0218 2.3514 -0.8917 395 
Belgium 0.0008 0.0039 0.1791 -0.1269 0.0281 8.5021 -0.1439 395 
France 0.0000 0.0032 0.1663 -0.1292 0.0312 4.8368 -0.0054 395 
Czech Rep 0.0034 0.0054 0.1021 -0.1030 0.0289 1.6819 -0.5389 395 
Finland -0.0006 0.0045 0.2297 -0.1863 0.0478 3.6787 -0.5578 395 
Germany 0.0003 0.0059 0.1715 -0.1522 0.0346 3.8362 -0.4076 395 
Luxembourg  0.0008 0.0036 0.1074 -0.1118 0.0276 2.6687 -0.5029 395 
Netherlands -0.0005 0.0035 0.2038 -0.1754 0.0338 7.7959 -0.3322 395 
Sweden 0.0001 0.0041 0.1349 -0.1727 0.0348 3.0880 -0.5371 395 
UK 0.0001 0.0022 0.1237 -0.0965 0.0221 5.4543 -0.0483 395 
Norway 0.0030 0.0066 0.0916 -0.1315 0.0278 2.5915 -0.9647 395 
Denmark 0.0018 0.0023 0.1068 -0.1483 0.0264 3.2978 -0.4106 395 
Ireland 0.0014 0.0040 0.0754 -0.1015 0.0249 1.6817 -0.6201 395 
Portugal 0.0003 0.0027 0.0725 -0.1132 0.0230 2.9877 -0.7696 395 
Greece -0.0002 0.0033 0.1448 -0.1374 0.0319 2.7634 -0.2241 395 
Spain 0.0006 0.0041 0.1239 -0.1067 0.0288 2.1961 -0.5524 395 
Italy -0.0001 0.0031 0.1060 -0.1259 0.0275 2.9442 -0.6688 395 
Latvia 0.0049 0.0054 0.2566 -0.4081 0.0422 42.8614 -2.9454 394 
Lithuania 0.0044 0.0031 0.0934 -0.0835 0.0232 2.1343 0.0932 394 
Malta 0.0010 -0.0007 0.1124 -0.0844 0.0221 3.9628 0.6773 395 
Estonia 0.0052 0.0041 0.1251 -0.1326 0.0272 3.8850 -0.3218 395 
Cyprus 0.0110 0.0085 0.1033 -0.1572 0.0354 4.9197 -1.1308 150 
Hungary 0.0030 0.0054 0.0955 -0.1239 0.0309 2.0639 -0.6925 395 
Poland 0.0032 0.0058 0.1192 -0.1104 0.0302 1.6720 -0.1551 395 
Romania  0.0080 0.0065 0.1708 -0.2501 0.0386 6.6811 -0.2863 395 
Bulgaria 0.0077 0.0055 0.1800 -0.1992 0.0378 6.0625 0.2137 352 
Slovakia 0.0043 0.0029 0.1432 -0.1034 0.0264 3.5345 0.5751 395 
Slovenia 0.0051 0.0000 0.1692 -0.0798 0.0246 13.6041 2.7484 395 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics - the period during the crisis 
Country 
During the crisis 
Mean 
return  Median Maxim Minim Std. Dev. Kurtosis Skewness 
N. 
Obs. 
Australia -0.0065 -0.0045 0.1202 -0.1153 0.0380 1.1858 -0.1869 87 
New Zealand -0.0069 -0.0061 0.0499 -0.0789 0.0235 0.4077 -0.0506 87 
Brazil  -0.0034 0.0044 0.1058 -0.2549 0.0541 4.2876 -1.1333 87 
Mexico -0.0049 -0.0045 0.0979 -0.1944 0.0432 3.8498 -1.0482 87 
Canada -0.0054 0.0007 0.0783 -0.1526 0.0364 2.4582 -0.8783 87 
USA -0.0072 -0.0024 0.0964 -0.1645 0.0381 3.4439 -0.7907 87 
Chile -0.0024 0.0030 0.0793 -0.1744 0.0339 6.8837 -1.5481 87 
China -0.0073 -0.0097 0.1392 -0.1177 0.0543 -0.3038 0.1307 87 
Hong Kong -0.0062 -0.0030 0.1556 -0.1548 0.0559 0.6188 -0.0562 87 
Indonesia -0.0060 0.0030 0.2045 -0.2330 0.0594 4.3818 -0.8013 87 
Korea -0.0056 -0.0056 0.1983 -0.1666 0.0532 2.7655 0.1142 87 
Taiwan -0.0069 -0.0058 0.1220 -0.1073 0.0466 -0.1347 0.0009 87 
Thailand -0.0081 -0.0028 0.1744 -0.1915 0.0475 5.6012 -0.6448 87 
India -0.0061 -0.0059 0.1521 -0.1564 0.0551 0.2799 -0.2085 87 
Japan -0.0086 -0.0085 0.1479 -0.2113 0.0474 3.7568 -0.5214 87 
Russia -0.0117 0.0000 0.2535 -0.4455 0.0927 6.1987 -1.1900 87 
South Africa -0.0036 0.0012 0.1375 -0.1075 0.0425 0.6496 0.2984 87 
Austria -0.0119 0.0026 0.1409 -0.2052 0.0584 1.0782 -0.6390 87 
Belgium -0.0108 -0.0070 0.0850 -0.1561 0.0440 0.6113 -0.3850 87 
France -0.0081 -0.0070 0.0696 -0.1480 0.0394 1.6350 -0.8623 87 
Czech Rep. -0.0095 -0.0007 0.1333 -0.1696 0.0531 1.7855 -0.5363 87 
Finland -0.0097 -0.0041 0.0948 -0.1373 0.0434 0.6991 -0.5974 87 
Germany -0.0069 -0.0021 0.0718 -0.1487 0.0423 1.9936 -1.0438 87 
Luxembourg  -0.0112 -0.0066 0.1095 -0.2590 0.0598 2.6154 -0.7701 87 
Netherlands -0.0102 -0.0024 0.0786 -0.1571 0.0434 0.9876 -0.5547 87 
Sweden -0.0073 -0.0040 0.1320 -0.1477 0.0435 1.4420 -0.1983 87 
UK -0.0060 0.0013 0.0717 -0.1230 0.0365 0.2348 -0.5031 87 
Norway -0.0086 -0.0022 0.1971 -0.2012 0.0572 2.9136 -0.4239 87 
Denmark -0.0091 -0.0063 0.1158 -0.1828 0.0449 2.2448 -0.6318 87 
Ireland -0.0160 -0.0187 0.1488 -0.1758 0.0602 0.7333 0.1310 87 
Portugal -0.0089 -0.0060 0.0916 -0.1892 0.0413 3.4191 -0.8471 87 
Greece -0.0126 -0.0060 0.1200 -0.1617 0.0512 0.6607 -0.1897 87 
Spain -0.0071 -0.0067 0.1192 -0.1200 0.0412 0.9122 -0.1616 87 
Italy -0.0105 -0.0088 0.1166 -0.1421 0.0435 1.3546 -0.1342 87 
Latvia -0.0143 -0.0060 0.1243 -0.2248 0.0410 9.0439 -1.6082 87 
Lithuania -0.0148 -0.0083 0.1483 -0.2950 0.0490 12.6114 -1.9952 87 
Malta -0.0068 -0.0040 0.0366 -0.0561 0.0156 1.5911 -0.5612 87 
Estonia -0.0146 -0.0100 0.1252 -0.2022 0.0440 4.2252 -0.6748 87 
Cyprus -0.0199 -0.0156 0.1485 -0.2336 0.0698 0.5160 -0.2446 87 
Hungary -0.0110 -0.0091 0.1338 -0.2005 0.0533 3.6937 -1.0532 87 
Poland -0.0107 -0.0104 0.1070 -0.1277 0.0456 0.4805 -0.3231 87 
Romania  -0.0168 -0.0084 0.1366 -0.1838 0.0576 0.6214 -0.4533 87 
Bulgaria -0.0198 -0.0111 0.0650 -0.2821 0.0582 7.1559 -2.0450 87 
Slovakia -0.0042 0.0000 0.0853 -0.0775 0.0225 4.5587 -0.3652 87 
Slovenia -0.0145 0.0000 0.1091 -0.2079 0.0557 2.8351 -1.1752 87 
  
 
During the financial crisis the situation changes dramatically. Table 2 shows that all the 
countries included in the analysis register a negative mean stock market return, which 
suggests that the impact and negative effects of the Global Financial Crisis translated at 
the level of each country and affected developed as well as emerging markets. There is 
however not a clear pattern on which group of countries was affected the most.   
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics - the period following financial crisis 
Country 
After the crisis 
Mean 
return  Median Maxim Minim Std. Dev. Kurtosis Skewness No. Obs. 
Australia 0.0015 0.0021 0.0684 -0.0473 0.0203 0.1257 0.0011 285 
New Zealand 0.0015 0.0010 0.0479 -0.0568 0.0131 1.7918 -0.0375 285 
Brazil  0.0012 0.0018 0.0866 -0.0887 0.0310 0.0486 -0.1178 285 
Mexico 0.0029 0.0033 0.0795 -0.0745 0.0221 1.3585 0.0292 285 
Canada 0.0020 0.0030 0.0744 -0.0721 0.0204 1.3764 -0.2426 285 
USA 0.0031 0.0048 0.0707 -0.1174 0.0217 3.5506 -0.7217 285 
Chile 0.0017 0.0029 0.0646 -0.0745 0.0193 1.6114 -0.4477 285 
China 0.0000 0.0000 0.0818 -0.1110 0.0287 1.6219 -0.4147 285 
Hong Kong 0.0021 0.0034 0.1204 -0.1059 0.0286 2.1980 0.1172 285 
Indonesia 0.0045 0.0054 0.0990 -0.1080 0.0245 2.8815 -0.2711 285 
Korea 0.0018 0.0026 0.0823 -0.1345 0.0248 3.3038 -0.6179 285 
Taiwan 0.0020 0.0037 0.1567 -0.0891 0.0243 6.5685 0.3692 285 
Thailand 0.0045 0.0089 0.0994 -0.1000 0.0268 1.7403 -0.4668 285 
India 0.0037 0.0047 0.1772 -0.0765 0.0286 4.6091 0.5789 285 
Japan 0.0022 0.0043 0.0909 -0.1523 0.0298 2.6849 -0.6862 285 
Russia 0.0018 0.0026 0.1454 -0.2126 0.0438 1.8906 -0.2800 285 
South Africa 0.0031 0.0034 0.0683 -0.0740 0.0218 0.9056 -0.1384 285 
Austria 0.0011 0.0046 0.1110 -0.1460 0.0340 1.7265 -0.4637 285 
Belgium 0.0021 0.0028 0.0754 -0.0910 0.0246 1.4588 -0.2988 285 
France 0.0015 0.0036 0.1113 -0.1402 0.0286 2.9370 -0.3342 285 
Czech Rep. 0.0007 0.0008 0.1195 -0.1567 0.0278 4.7789 -0.1923 285 
Finland 0.0016 0.0034 0.0961 -0.1057 0.0304 1.3453 -0.0554 285 
Germany 0.0029 0.0051 0.1094 -0.1680 0.0286 5.2348 -0.8010 285 
Luxembourg  0.0007 -0.0006 0.0963 -0.1676 0.0349 1.8965 -0.2476 285 
Netherlands 0.0022 0.0025 0.0940 -0.1138 0.0257 2.2632 -0.2947 285 
Sweden 0.0026 0.0045 0.0970 -0.0868 0.0247 1.5896 -0.3063 285 
UK 0.0021 0.0040 0.0687 -0.1081 0.0215 2.7878 -0.5364 285 
Norway 0.0032 0.0045 0.0932 -0.1290 0.0263 3.2700 -0.6898 285 
Denmark 0.0041 0.0050 0.0991 -0.0926 0.0249 1.8664 -0.1120 285 
Ireland 0.0029 0.0051 0.1009 -0.1290 0.0269 3.2739 -0.5554 285 
Portugal -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0730 -0.1257 0.0307 1.2870 -0.3866 285 
Greece -0.0013 0.0015 0.1883 -0.1447 0.0481 0.7656 -0.0492 285 
Spain 0.0011 0.0016 0.1125 -0.1262 0.0335 0.8962 -0.1072 285 
Italy 0.0009 0.0017 0.1087 -0.1474 0.0354 1.3359 -0.2355 285 
Latvia 0.0025 0.0015 0.1400 -0.1403 0.0271 5.5825 0.0348 285 
Lithuania 0.0037 0.0021 0.1963 -0.1556 0.0265 16.0913 1.1206 285 
Malta 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0922 -0.0563 0.0167 6.0532 1.0771 285 
Estonia 0.0036 0.0005 0.1452 -0.1058 0.0273 5.2776 1.1207 285 
Cyprus -0.0073 -0.0036 0.3704 -0.2276 0.0726 4.0391 0.7062 285 
Hungary 0.0018 0.0009 0.1507 -0.1664 0.0340 3.0920 -0.0314 285 
Poland 0.0027 0.0034 0.1252 -0.1755 0.0274 7.3624 -0.6065 285 
Romania  0.0038 0.0039 0.1091 -0.1327 0.0311 2.9826 -0.3950 285 
Bulgaria 0.0024 0.0014 0.1609 -0.0753 0.0265 6.1807 1.2725 285 
Slovakia -0.0012 0.0012 0.1383 -0.1389 0.0251 8.2901 -0.7953 285 
Slovenia -0.0005 0.0008 0.0816 -0.0923 0.0266 0.4144 -0.1274 285 
 
 
Table 3 shows that after the crisis ended stock markets tend to register a mean positive 
return. This suggests that the consequences of the financial crisis are not present 
anymore or that their impact has lost in value for almost all the countries included in the 
analysis. However, there are five countries that continue the trend registered during the 
crisis and record negative mean returns. These are: Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus, Greece 
and Portugal. 
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Figure 5: Aggregate stock market indices 2000-2014: Japan, Germany, UK and USA. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Aggregate stock market indices 2000-2014: Japan, Germany, UK, USA and 
the global stock index 
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Figure 7: Aggregate stock market indices 2000-2014: Japan, Germany, UK, USA and 
the global financials stock index 
 
 
Figure 5, 6, and 7 present the evolution of the major stock market indices, the global 
stock index and the global financials stock index. From the above mentioned figures it 
can be seen that stock markets tend to co-move in time and that their evolution is 
similar. This suggests that stock markets are integrated at certain levels and that during 
turbulent times the negative effects will be felt at the level of each economy and stock 
market in part. Taking a look at the graphs it can be seen that during the Global 
Financial Crisis, and in particular in September 2008, all stock markets registered 
significant and similar losses, suggesting the presence of contagion between markets. 
Previous literature (Longstaff, 2010; Baur, 2012; Guo et all., 2011) find significant co-
movement between stock markets during the financial crisis. Moreover the results show 
the presence of contagion between markets during this period. 
 
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
This thesis uses two econometric models in order to quantify the level of dependencies 
between countries and the contagion that is transmitted from one economy to another in 
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the crisis period. The first econometric model proposed by Baur (2012) takes the 
following form: 
 
(1)                    RM,i,t = a + b1RW,t + b2RW,tDt + eS,i,t 
 
(2)                    hS,i,t  = π +αe
2
S,i,t-1 + βe
2
S,i,t-1I(eS,i,t-1<0) + γhS,i,t-1 
 
(3)                    eS,i,t = (hS,i,t)
0,5
ZS,i,t 
 
(4)                    ZS,i    N(0,1) 
 
The system composed of equations (1) to (4) measures the degree of co-movement 
between a country portfolio (M) with a global portfolio (W) during a period of 
economic stability and during a crisis. The b1 parameter represents the degree of co-
movement in normal times and b2 measures the degree of co-movement in the crisis 
period. The variable Dt is a dummy variable which takes value one if the observation is 
from a crisis period, and zero otherwise. The subscript M represents the country.  
 
Since this paper aims to test the level of cointegration between countries in three 
different economic states: before the crisis, during the crisis and after the crisis, and to 
test for contagion the econometric model will take the following form: 
 
(5)                    RM,i,t = a + b1RW,t + b2RW,tDt, crisis + b3RW,tDt, post-crisis  + eS,i,t 
 
(6)                    hS,i,t  = π +αe
2
S,i,t-1 + βe
2
S,i,t-1I(eS,i,t-1<0) + γhS,i,t-1 
 
(7)                    eS,i,t = (hS,i,t)
0,5
ZS,i,t 
 
(8)                    ZS,i    N(0,1) 
 
The b1 parameter represents the degree of co-movement in normal times, b2 measures 
the degree of co-movement in the crisis period and b3 measures the degree of co-
movement in the post-crisis period. The variable Dt, crisis is a dummy variable which 
takes value one if the observation is from a crisis period, and zero otherwise, while the 
variable Dt, post-crisis is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the observation 
is from the post-crisis period and zero otherwise.  
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Previous literature (Dungey & Gajurel, 2014; Chevallier, 2012) found out that the 
Global Financial Crisis originated in US, the epicenter being financial sector. Therefore, 
in order to estimate the global financial sector contagion, the second model proposed by 
Baur (2012) takes the form: 
 
(9)                    RM,i,t = a + b1RFin,W,t + b2RFin, W,tDt, crisis + b3RFin,W,tDt, post-crisis  + eFin,i,t 
 
(10)                    hS,i,t  = π +αe
2
S,i,t-1 + βe
2
S,i,t-1I(eS,i,t-1<0) + γhS,i,t-1 
 
(11)                    eS,i,t = (hS,i,t)
0,5
ZS,i,t 
 
(12)                    ZS,i    N(0,1) 
 
The system composed of equations (9) to (12) measures the degree of co-movement 
between a country's portfolio (M) with a global financial portfolio (W) during three 
different economic states. The b1 parameter represents the degree of co-movement in 
normal times, b2 measures the degree of co-movement in the crisis period and b3 
measures the degree of co-movement in the post-crisis period. The variable Dt, crisis is a 
dummy variable which takes value one if the observation is from a crisis period, and 
zero otherwise, while the variable Dt, post-crisis is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of one if the observation is from the post-crisis period and zero otherwise.  
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5. RESULTS 
 
 
Previous literature (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Dungey et al., 2006; Chandar et all., 
2009) describes contagion as being a significant increase in co-movement between two 
or more markets or asset classes, and a strong correlation coefficient in a crisis period 
when compared to a tranquil or benchmark period. However, Baur and Lucey (2009) 
state that the above mentioned condition is not enough to say that there is contagion 
between markets or asset classes because if there is a positive correlation change but the 
level remains in a negative correlation state, then the affirmation that there exists 
contagion fails to be accepted. Therefore, the authors define contagion as a significant 
increase in the correlation coefficient in a crisis period compared to a tranquil period 
evolving into a positive correlation level. This analysis concentrates on Baur et al. 
(2009) definition when analyzing the correlations between markets.  
 
In order to make a clear picture regarding what happened during the financial crisis, 
how and to which countries the negative effects translated to, this paper divides the 
whole countries sample in 4 main groups: South and North America, Europe, Asia and 
Other Major Economies.  Table 4 presents the relationship between major South and 
North American stock markets and the global stock index during three economic states.  
 
 
Table 4: North and South America's aggregate stock market contagion 
Country Intercept              b1             b2           b3 Contagion 
USA (S&P 500) -0.0002 0.9744*** -0.0601** -0.0707*** 
No 
 
(0.880) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
USA (Dow Jones) -0.0015 0.9007*** -0.0808*** -0.0769*** No 
 
(0.191) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
USA (Nasdaq) 0.0016 1.1906*** -0.2718*** -0.2326*** No 
 
(0.283) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Brazil -0.0065 1.2075*** -0.0719 -0.2446*** No 
 
(0.101) (0.000) (0.382) (0.003) 
Canada 0.0022 0.7503*** 0.0677 -0.0650* No 
 
(0.165) (0.000) (0.112) (0.077) 
Chile 0.0010 0.2540*** 0.3655*** 0.1955*** Yes 
 
(0.695) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mexico -0.0008 0.9004*** -0.0278 -0.2552*** No 
 
(0.764) (0.000) (0.641) (0.000) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
52 
 
From the above table it can be seen that all countries' aggregate stock markets register a 
positive correlation with the global stock market. The two most extreme values are 
registered by Brazil and Chile. Brazil's stock market records the highest co-movement 
interdependence with the global stock market, the value of the coefficient being 1.21, 
while Chile records the lowest correlation with global stock market index, 
approximately 0.24. The other countries register a median value equal to 0.94.  
 
Taking the analysis to the crisis period it can be seen that the results construct an exactly 
opposite picture. All countries register a negative relationship between local stock 
markets and global stock index except Chile and Canada, with the latter being 
insignificant. This reveals that during the Global Financial Crisis the negative effects 
and contagion translated to Chile's stock market. Therefore, the thesis finds support in 
favor of the first hypothesis only in case of Chile, while for other countries this is not 
the case. However, the fact that other countries did not register a significant positive 
correlation coefficient does not mean that their economies did not feel the crisis' 
consequences.   
 
The same trend continues to be recorded even after the crisis finished. All countries 
register a statistically significant negative correlation with global stock market while 
Chile records a positive value. This suggests that Chile's economy is still highly 
integrated with the global economy and that there still might be left some traces of 
contagion at the level of stock market. The second hypothesis which states that after the 
crisis the correlation coefficient between local stock market and global stock market is 
higher when compared to the pre-crisis period, finds statistical support just in Chile's 
case.  
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Table 5: Developed Europe's aggregate stock market contagion 
Country Intercept           b1                   b2                    b3 Contagion 
UK -0.0011 0.8062*** 0.0202 0.0502 
No 
 
(0.428) (0.000) (0.577) (0.136) 
Austria -0.0014 0.5129*** 0.6133*** 0.6951*** Yes 
 
(0.774) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Belgium 0.0009 0.8456*** 0.0961 0.0786* No 
 
(0.561) (0.000) (0.111) (0.096) 
Denmark -0.1072*** 0.8588*** 0.1734*** -0.1274** Yes 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.034) 
Finland 0.0011 1.1552*** -0.2667*** -0.0708 No 
 
(0.572) (0.000) (0.002) (0.413) 
France -0.0028* 1.0958*** -0.0480 0.0199 No 
 
(0.079) (0.000) (0.279) (0.675) 
Germany 0.0002 1.2189*** -0.1837*** -0.1253** No 
 
(0.936) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) 
Greece 0.0041 0.7187*** 0.2380*** 0.3829*** Yes 
 
(0.190) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Ireland 0.0049** 0.7478*** 0.3960*** 0.1316** Yes 
 
(0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) 
Italy -0.0022 0.9434*** 0.0013 0.2962*** No 
 
(0.336) (0.000) (0.980) (0.000) 
Luxembourg 0.0039* 0.6630*** 0.1287* 0.3497*** Yes 
 
(0.097) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) 
Netherlands 0.0000 1.0710*** -0.1128** -0.0586 No 
 
(0.993) (0.000) (0.038) (0.253) 
Norway -0.0001 0.7941*** 0.2382*** 0.1072** Yes 
 
(0.946) (0.000) (0.005) (0.049) 
Portugal 0.0019 0.5553*** 0.1392** 0.2625*** Yes 
 
(0.509) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) 
Spain 0.0017 1.0122*** -0.1765*** 0.0949 No 
 
(0.456) (0.000) (0.003) (0.193) 
Sweden -0.0001 1.2115*** -0.2675*** -0.3159*** No 
 
(0.949) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
In order to present a clearer picture about the correlation between European countries' 
stock markets and global stock market during different economic states this thesis 
divides European countries in two groups: Developed Europe and Emerging Europe. 
Table 5 presents the regression results for the Developed Europe group.  
 
The results reveal that there is a positive relationship between all countries included in 
the group and the global stock market index. The coefficients take values from the 
interval [0.5129; 1.2189]. The lowest value corresponds to Austria while the highest 
value is registered by Germany. Moving forward, during the financial crisis the situation 
changes significantly the results tending to divide the countries in two subclasses: 
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countries in which is registered a significant contagion and countries which did not 
register a significant co-movement with the global index. In the first subclass goes: 
Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal. These 
countries register a significant increase in co-movement between their stock market and 
the global stock market. The values range between 0.1287 (Luxembourg) and 0.6133 
(Austria). The thesis finds economic and statistic support in favor of these countries. 
The other subclass registers a negative or insignificant co-movement with the global 
stock index. This means that investors which placed their money in these countries 
during the financial crisis managed to protect at least partially their investments, while 
those who invested in countries from the first subclass remained exposed to losses 
which translated from US market into these markets. 
 
After the crisis, the situation tends to take a slightly different turn. The results reveal an 
increase in co-movement between these countries and the global stock index when 
compared to the crisis period. This can be explained by the fact that the Global 
Financial Crisis originated in the US and therefore the European countries felt its 
consequences as a foreign shock while the after crisis period is marked by an important 
event for Eurozone: the sovereign debt crisis which originated internally and affected 
the majority of the members.  The countries which register an increased correlation 
coefficient are: UK, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Portugal, and Spain. Denmark turns from positive significant coefficient 
during the crisis to negative significant coefficient after the crisis. Sweden maintains its 
isolated status even after the crisis serving as a good protection against this increased 
co-movement phenomenon registered at the level of majority of countries. The second 
hypothesis finds support only in case of: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal.  
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Table 6: Emerging Europe's aggregate stock market contagion 
Country Intercept          b1               b2           b3 Contagion 
Bulgaria 0.0026 0.0645 0.7880*** 0.1542** Yes 
 
(0.275) (0.160) (0.000) (0.012) 
Czech Republic -0.0079** 0.6098*** 0.3886*** 0.2383*** Yes 
 
(0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Cyprus 0.0132** 0.6831*** 0.4458* 0.5050* Yes 
 
(0.013) (0.000) (0.052) (0.059) 
Estonia 0.0003 0.3818*** 0.1199** 0.0618 Yes 
 
(0.915) (0.000) (0.048) (0.371) 
Hungary -0.0071 0.6759*** 0.1545* 0.2178*** Yes 
 
(0.240) (0.000) (0.070) (0.003 
Lithuania 0.0000 0.0637 0.3780*** 0.2991*** Yes 
 
(0.990) (0.202) (0.000) (0.000) 
Malta 0.0021 0.0943*** -0.0912* -0.1119** No 
 
(0.337) (0.003) (0.093) (0.040) 
Poland -0.0006 0.6383*** 0.1905** 0.1411** Yes 
 
(0.849) (0.000) (0.025) (0.013) 
Romania 0.0010 0.0606 0.7249*** 0.6803*** Yes 
 
(0.791) (0.408) (0.000) (0.000) 
Slovenia 0.0017 0.0334 0.8299*** 0.5186*** Yes 
 
(0.702) (0.639) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latvia 0.0037** -0.0077 0.5199*** 0.2193*** Yes 
 
(0.045) (0.750) (0.000) (0.001) 
Slovakia -0.0004 0.2167*** -0.2715*** -0.1197 No 
 
(0.867) (0.000) (0.000) (0.123) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
From the perspective of Emerging Europe group, Table 6 reveals that 8 out of 12 
countries have a significant positive correlation between their local stock market 
indexes and the global stock index, while 4 countries register an insignificant or 
negative correlation coefficient. During the crisis period the situation changes 
considerably, the results identifying a considerable increase in co-movement between 
these countries’ stock indexes and the global index, resulting in a significant contagion 
at the level of Emerging Europe countries. The correlation coefficient ranges between 
0.1199 and 0.8299 in absolute value. The country which registered the highest level of 
contagion is Slovenia. Its correlation coefficient evolved from an insignificant 0.0334 to 
a highly significant 0.8299. Those investors who had exposure to Slovenia’s economy 
lost completely their diversification benefits and suffered considerable losses. Only two 
countries from this group registered a significant decoupling from the global economy 
during the Global Financial Crisis: Malta and Slovakia which recorded a significant 
negative correlation coefficient, -0.0912 and -0.2715 respectively. Therefore the thesis 
finds support in favor of the first hypothesis for all countries except Malta and Slovakia.  
56 
 
Moving to the post-crisis period the results reveal a decrease in correlations between the 
countries included in the table and the global index when compared to the crisis period. 
However, the still positive significant coefficients suggest that there might be left some 
traces of contagion in the markets and that the stock markets of these countries co-move 
with the global stock index, and are vulnerable to international shocks. Malta and 
Slovakia continue to record a negative correlation with Estonia following the trend and 
going from positive significant correlation during the crisis to positive but insignificant 
correlation after the crisis. The second hypothesis is not supported just in case of these 
three countries. Comparing Emerging Europe countries group with Developed Europe 
group it can be seen that the first group was affected more by the financial crisis and 
suffered a higher degree of contagion while the contagion phenomenon was registered 
in a fewer developed countries.  
 
 
Table 7: Asia's aggregate stock market contagion 
Country Intercept            b1               b2          b3 Contagion 
China -0.0101** 0.1013 0.2152* 0.3319*** Yes 
 
(0.019) (0.160) (0.094) (0.001) 
Hong Kong -0.0018 0.7892*** 0.4573*** 0.0966 Yes 
 
(0.505) (0.000) (0.000) (0.188) 
India 0.0019 0.4346*** 0.4026*** 0.1631* Yes 
 
(0.700) (0.000) (0.000) (0.088) 
Indonesia 0.0017 0.2611*** 0.6103*** 0.2513*** Yes 
 
(0.616) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Japan -0.0047 0.7121*** 0.2395*** 0.0647 Yes 
 
(0.459) (0.000) (0.000) (0.347) 
Korea -0.0013 0.9737*** -0.0838 -0.2774*** No 
 
(0.537) (0.000) (0.311) (0.000) 
Taiwan -0.0009 0.7264*** 0.0769 -0.0950 No 
 
(0.671) (0.000) (0.435) (0.203) 
Thailand 0.0041 0.4939*** 0.0770 0.0557 No 
 
(0.274) (0.000) (0.264) (0.529) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
Another important and major investment region is Asia. Table 7 reveals that all the 
countries included in this group have a strong positive correlation with the global stock 
market except China, which seems to be isolated from the global economy. The highest 
correlation value is registered by Korea (0.9737). During the crisis the image changes 
considerably. Hong Kong, India, Indonesia and Japan register a highly significant co-
movement with the global index. China records just a week co-movement, the 
correlation coefficient being significant just at 10 per cent. On the other side Korea, 
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which had the highest correlation coefficient before the crisis, during the crisis its stock 
market decouples from the global markets, the correlation coefficient becoming 
negative but insignificant. Taiwan and Thailand do not register any contagion during the 
Global Financial Crisis. Therefore, the first hypothesis is not supported just in case of 
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
 
The post-crisis period reveals that only India and Indonesia still have a significant 
positive correlation coefficient. However, when compared to the crisis period the values 
are lower. China, on the other hand, registers an increase in correlation for the post-
crisis period. This is explained by the increasing role that China has started to play at 
the level of global economy, and its evolution to a major player on stock markets. 
Similar results are found by Yang et all. (2014). Hong Kong and Japan’s correlation 
values come close to their pre-crisis levels. The second hypothesis finds support just for 
China, India and Indonesia.  
 
 
Table 8: Other countries group aggregate stock market contagion 
Country Intercept         b1                b2             b3 Contagion 
Australia 0.0039 0.4373*** 0.4016*** 0.2579*** Yes 
 
(0.128) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
New Zealand 0.0008 0.2261*** 0.1137** 0.1028** Yes 
 
(0.749) (0.000) (0.028) (0.012) 
Russia -0.0061 0.8460*** 0.4393*** 0.5089*** Yes 
 
(0.140) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
South Africa 0.0006 0.7580*** 0.1209** -0.0517 Yes 
 
(0.758) (0.000) (0.019) (0.310) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
The other countries group reveals that there is a positive relationship between stock 
market of these individual countries and global stock market. The highest correlation is 
registered by Russia (0.8460). The period corresponding to the Global Financial Crisis 
is characterized by a statistically significant positive correlation at the level of each 
country finding support in this way to the existence of contagion in their stock markets. 
The most affected seems to be Russia and Australia. The first hypothesis finds support 
for all countries.  
 
The period after the crisis is characterized by lower correlations between local and 
global stock markets when compared to the pre-crisis period. However, for three 
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countries the correlation is still positive and significant. Russia seems to co-move more 
and more with the global stock market and economy. Its correlation coefficient after the 
crisis increased, registering a significant positive value equal to 0.5089. Only South 
Africa registers a negative correlation coefficient even though not significant. Therefore 
the second hypothesis is not supported only in case of South Africa.  
 
Because it is a unanimous opinion that the Global Financial Crisis originated in the US 
and started from the financial sector, this thesis further analyzes how the consequences 
of the crisis translated from the global financial sector to each country's stock market in 
part and contaminated them. Table 9 presents the results for the major economies from 
North and South America.  
 
 
Table 9: North and South America's financial sector contagion 
Country Intercept         b1               b2             b3 Contagion 
USA (S&P 500) 0.0017 0.5307*** 0.1385*** 0.2406*** Yes 
 
(0.103) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
USA (Dow Jones) -0.0001 0.5421*** 0.0342 0.1458*** No 
 
(0.930) (0.000) (0.361) (0.000) 
USA (Nasdaq) 0.0030** 0.4068*** 0.3411*** 0.4375*** Yes 
 
(0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Brazil -0.0081* 0.4735*** 0.4158*** 0.3642*** Yes 
 
(0.078) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Canada 0.0041** 0.4453*** 0.1272** 0.1455*** Yes 
 
(0.019) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) 
Chile 0.0004 0.1518*** 0.4167*** 0.2508*** Yes 
 
(0.874) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mexico 0.0013 0.4782*** 0.1620*** 0.0486 Yes 
 
(0.631) (0.000) (0.005) (0.446) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
The results from the above table show that there is a significant positive correlation 
between each country’s stock market and the global financial index. When analyzing 
the period corresponding to the Global Financial Crisis it can be seen that the 
correlation coefficients for all countries are positive and highly significant which 
suggests that there is contagion coming from financial sector to the entire stock market. 
The most affected is Chile and Brazil. The first hypothesis finds support in case of all 
countries. Moving to the post-crisis period the situation is slightly different. All 
countries except Mexico register significant positive correlations. For Canada and US 
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the values of the coefficients are even higher when compared to the crisis period. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis finds support for all countries except Mexico. 
 
 
Table 10: Developed Europe's financial sector contagion 
Country Intercept        b1              b2          b3 Contagion 
UK -0.0004 0.4981*** 0.1581*** 0.2240*** Yes 
 
(0.785) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Austria -0.0033 0.4104*** 0.5423*** 0.6918*** Yes 
 
(0.496) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Belgium 0.0014 0.6356*** -0.0850* 0.1423*** No 
 
(0.359) (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) 
Denmark 0.0038 0.5403*** 0.2527*** 0.0604 Yes 
 
(0.206) (0.000) (0.001) (0.325) 
Finland 0.0031* 0.6115*** -0.0105 0.3261*** No 
 
(0.079) (0.000) (0.908) (0.000) 
France 0.0010 0.7622*** -0.2790*** 0.1368*** No 
 
(0.531) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
Germany 0.0016 0.8139*** -0.4772*** 0.0601 No 
 
(0.352) (0.000) (0.000) (0.229) 
Greece 0.0057* 0.5457*** 0.1442 0.3874*** No 
 
(0.088) (0.000) (0.132) (0.000) 
Ireland 0.0047* 0.5831*** 0.2696*** 0.1529** Yes 
 
(0.075) (0.000) (0.005) (0.014) 
Italy -0.0001 0.7408*** -0.0871 0.3037*** No 
 
(0.981) (0.000) (0.136) (0.000) 
Luxembourg 0.0046* 0.5016*** -0.0204 0.3920*** No 
 
(0.056) (0.000) (0.821) (0.000) 
Netherlands 0.0010 0.6608*** -0.0294 0.1751*** No 
 
(0.507) (0.000) (0.675) (0.001) 
Norway 0.0004 0.3822*** 0.4576*** 0.4267*** Yes 
 
(0.848) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Portugal 0.0032 0.4125*** 0.1143* 0.2753*** Yes 
 
(0.229) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) 
Spain 0.0035 0.7557*** -0.2809*** 0.1748*** No 
 
(0.122) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
Sweden 0.0014 0.7179*** -0.0593 0.0066 No 
 
(0.448) (0.000) (0.361) (0.913) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
The results reveal that there is a positive relationship between all countries included in 
the group and the global financial stock index. The coefficients take values from the 
interval [0.3822; 0.8139]. The lowest value corresponds to Norway, while the highest 
value is registered by Germany. Moving forward, during the financial crisis the situation 
changes significantly, the results tending to divide the countries in two subclasses: 
countries in which is registered a significant contagion and countries which did not 
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register a significant co-movement with the global index. In the first subclass goes: UK, 
Austria, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal. These countries register a significant 
increase in co-movement between their stock market and the global financial stocks. 
The values range between 0.1147 (Portugal) and 0.5423 (Austria). The first hypothesis 
finds support for these countries, attesting significant contagion in the markets. The 
other subclass registers a negative or insignificant co-movement with the global stock 
index. This suggests that investors which placed their money in these countries during 
the financial crisis managed to protect at least partially their investments, while those 
who invested in countries from the first subclass remained exposed to losses, which 
translated from US like a storm who does not know limits. 
 
After the crisis the situation tends to take a slightly different turn. The results reveal an 
increase in co-movement between these countries and the global stock index when 
compared to the crisis period. This can be explained by the fact that the Global 
Financial Crisis originated in the US and therefore the European countries felt its 
consequences as a foreign shock, while the after crisis period is marked by an important 
event for Eurozone: the sovereign debt crisis which originated internally and affected 
the majority of the members.  The countries which register an increased correlation 
coefficient are: UK, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Spain. Denmark turns from positive 
significant coefficient during the crisis to positive coefficient but insignificant after the 
crisis. Sweden maintains its isolated status even after the crisis serving as a good 
protection against this increased co-movement phenomenon registered at the level of 
majority of countries. The thesis finds support in favor of the second hypothesis just for: 
UK, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Spain. 
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Table 11: Emerging Europe financial sector contagion 
Country Intercept           b1               b2          b3 Contagion 
Bulgaria 0.0026 0.0294 0.8039*** 0.1820*** Yes 
 
(0.264) (0.390) (0.000) (0.002) 
Czech Republic -0.0057 0.4535*** 0.2830*** 0.2924*** Yes 
 
(0.119) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cyprus 0.0146*** 0.6444*** 0.1646 0.3449 No 
 
(0.006) (0.000) (0.504) (0.123) 
Estonia 0.0002 0.2264*** 0.1414* 0.1680** No 
 
(0.931) (0.000) (0.054) (0.018) 
Hungary -0.0072 0.4638*** 0.1220 0.3335*** No 
 
(0.207) (0.000) (0.145) (0.000) 
Lithuania -0.0003 0.0657** 0.3063*** 0.2914*** Yes 
 
(0.893) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) 
Malta 0.0023 0.0672*** -0.0591 -0.0833 No 
 
(0.315) (0.003) (0.288) (0.111) 
Poland 0.0002 0.3818*** 0.2235*** 0.3047*** Yes 
 
(0.932) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
Romania -0.0004 0.1231** 0.6539*** 0.6103*** Yes 
 
(0.922) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) 
Slovenia 0.0002 0.0649 0.7686*** 0.5125*** Yes 
 
(0.957) (0.262) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latvia 0.0045*** -0.0249 0.5280*** 0.2397*** Yes 
 
(0.004) (0.187) (0.000) (0.000) 
Slovakia -0.0005 0.0617 -0.1303* 0.0359 No 
 
(0.831) (0.124) (0.070) (0.649) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
From the perspective of Emerging Europe group Table 11 reveals that 8 out of 12 
countries have a significant positive correlation between their local stock market 
indexes and the global stock index, while 4 countries register an insignificant 
correlation coefficient. During the crisis period the situation changes considerably, the 
results identifying a considerable increase in co-movement between these countries’ 
stock indexes and the global index, resulting in a significant contagion at the level of 
Emerging Europe countries. The correlation coefficient ranges between 0.1220 and 
0.8039 in absolute value. The country which registered the highest level of contagion is 
Bulgaria, followed by Slovenia. Its correlation coefficient evolved from an insignificant 
0.0294 to a highly significant 0.8039 and 0.0649 to 0.7686 respectively for Slovenia. 
Those investors who had exposure to these two economies lost completely their 
diversification benefits and suffered considerable losses. Only one country from this 
group registered a significant decoupling from the global economy during the Global 
Financial Crisis: Slovakia which recorded a significant negative correlation coefficient, 
-0.1303. Malta, Cyprus and Hungary have positive but insignificant correlation 
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coefficients. Therefore the first hypothesis finds support for all countries except Malta, 
Slovakia, Cyprus and Hungary.  
 
Moving to the post-crisis period the results reveal a decrease in correlations between the 
countries included in the table and the global index when compared to the crisis period. 
However, the still positive significant coefficients suggest that there might be left some 
traces of contagion in the markets and that the stock markets of these countries co-move 
with the global stock index and are vulnerable to international shocks. The second 
hypothesis ddoes not find support in case of Slovakia, Malta and Cyprus. Comparing 
Emerging Europe countries group with Developed Europe group it can be seen that the 
first group was affected more by the financial crisis and suffered a higher degree of 
contagion while the contagion phenomenon was registered in a fewer developed 
countries.  
 
 
Table 12: Asia financial sector contagion 
Country Intercept        b1          b2            b3 Contagion 
India 0.0030 0.3238*** 0.3574*** 0.2050** Yes 
 
(0.571) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) 
Indonesia 0.0022 0.1475*** 0.6429*** 0.3282*** Yes 
 
(0.534) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
China -0.0100** 0.1207** 0.1336 0.2825*** No 
 
(0.021) (0.027) (0.307) (0.004) 
Hong Kong -0.0014 0.5545*** 0.2651*** 0.1795** Yes 
 
(0.597) (0.000) (0.001) (0.013) 
Japan 0.0010 0.3993*** 0.4121*** 0.2991*** Yes 
 
(0.868) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Korea 0.0003 0.4978*** 0.1200 0.0748 No 
 
(0.888) (0.000) (0.184) (0.347) 
Taiwan 0.0005 0.4060*** 0.1961** 0.1329* Yes 
 
(0.830) (0.000) (0.043) (0.064) 
Thailand 0.0035 0.2667*** 0.2321*** 0.2137** Yes 
 
(0.369) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 12 examines the relationship between the global financial index and the local 
stock market index for each country in part. The results reveal a positive relationship 
before the crisis, Hong Kong registering the highest value (0.5545), while China the 
weakest and just partial significant (0.1207). This is explained by the fact that Hong 
Kong is an important financial center in Asia and has strong relations with financial 
centers from all around the globe. During the crisis 6 out of 8 countries register a 
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positive and significant correlation coefficient proving the existence of contagion at the 
level of their stock market. The highest level of contagion is registered by Indonesia 
(0.6429), followed by Japan. Korea and China record positive coefficients but 
insignificant, which means that the contagion registered at the level of China in Table 7 
came mainly from other sectors than financials. The first hypothesis is supported for all 
group members except China and Korea.  
 
Moving forward, the period after the crisis is characterized by a decline in the co-
movement between global financial stock market and all local stock markets except 
China. China continues to register a relatively high positive correlation coefficient   
when compared to the pre-crisis period, and higher than during the crisis. This suggests 
that Chinese stock market and economy in general tend to become more and more 
integrated with the global economy. This is not surprising keeping account of the fact 
that China has taken the place of US as the leading global economy, and is the biggest 
stock market in Asia. In the same order of thoughts, the positive and significant 
correlation coefficients registered at the level of each country suggests that these 
economies are still highly integrated and sensible to global shocks, and they have not 
recovered completely from the financial crisis. The only country which seems 
independent from global financials is Korea.  Therefore, the second hypothesis finds 
support for all countries except Korea. 
 
 
Table 13: Other countries group financial sector contagion 
Country Intercept             b1              b2              b3 Contagion 
Australia 0.0014 0.3161*** 0.3909*** 0.2879*** Yes 
 
(0.564) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
New Zealand 0.0016 0.1434*** 0.1302*** 0.1482*** Yes 
 
(0.528) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Russia -0.0062 0.3697*** 0.8219*** 0.8927*** Yes 
 
(0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
South Africa 0.0015 0.3995*** 0.2604*** 0.2113*** Yes 
 
(0.426) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
Taking the analysis to the level of other four major global economies: Australia, New 
Zealand, Russia, and South Africa, Table 13 presents similar results with those from 
Table 8.  There is a positive relationship between each country's stock index and global 
financial index with Russia having one of the highest values. During the crisis all 
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countries record positive significant coefficients, which demonstrate that financial 
contagion is present at the level of each country's stock market. Russia registers the 
highest value which is almost triple when compared to the pre-crisis period. The first 
hypothesis is supported at the level of the entire group. 
 
After the crisis the situation does not change for Russia, which registers even a higher 
correlation level than during the crisis. The same is true for New Zealand while 
Australia and South Africa tend to destroy the trend created during the crisis. A lower 
but still positive and significant coefficient is registered. The second hypothesis is 
supported for all countries.  
 
Moving forward this thesis analyzes the impact that the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
has had on the European countries. Because this crisis affected and started at the level of 
individual governments, the thesis analyzes how the confidence in capacity of 
governments to repay their debt, measured by foreign government Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS), evolved during the crisis and which one were affected the most.  Figure 8, 9, 10, 
and 11 present the evolution of CDS spreads in developed, emerging European 
countries as well as in GIIPS countries.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Evolution of CDS spreads in Emerging Europe countries 
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From Figure 8 it can be seen that during a crisis or an uncertain period the CDS spreads 
tend to increase, reflecting a loss in confidence that governments will be able to repay 
their debt in time and without any difficulties. An interesting fact reflected in Figure 8 is 
that Emerging European countries were affected more by the Global Financial Crisis 
from 2007-2009 than by the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, fact proved by the level of 
CDS spreads, which during the 2007-2009 were higher than during the 2010-2012 
period. The less affected country is Czech Republic, while Croatia was affected the 
most, its CDS spreads rising from 300 basis points at the end of 2009 to 700 at the 
beginning of 2011. This means that the consequences of the crisis which originated in 
the GIIPS countries translated to other European countries very quick.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Evolution of CDS spreads in developed Europe countries 
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Europe. An explanation why this happened is that in order to save the GIIPS countries 
from collapse and incapacity of repaying their debts the European countries 
implemented a bailout program meant to financially support the economy of the 
countries. Therefore they raised money by taking more debt on their own balance 
sheets, which made investors and financial institutions to be worried that these countries 
are becoming at their turn too indebted, resulting in the end in a CDS spreads increase. 
These results are in line with those of Ludwig (2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of CDS spreads in GIIPS countries.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Evolution of CDS spreads for Greece. 
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Moving forward and taking the analysis at the level of GIIPS countries' economy from 
Figure 10 and 11, it can be seen that the problems started to appear in September 2008, 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The CDS spreads started to increase gradually 
until middle of 2009, while at the end of 2010 they sky-rocketed. The countries most 
affected are Greece and Portugal. Their CDS spreads raised more than 25000 basis point 
for Greece and 1200 for Portugal. The situation started to ameliorate after first quarter 
of 2011 for Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland, while for Greece it took a lot more time. 
Just at the end of 2013 the CDS spreads came back to a more or less normal value.  
 
In summary, the European Sovereign Debt Crisis affected all the bloc members and the 
consequences translated at the level of each country's economy. Developed countries 
were affected less thanks to their big and powerful economies, while emerging countries 
felt the consequences more in depth. Currently Europe has to implement well thought 
and planed measures to revive its economy and to become again a powerful global 
player.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the spread of the Global Financial Crisis and that of the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis to other countries and members. Moreover, it tests if after the 
crisis finished, the economy and the correlations between countries came to their pre-
crisis levels. In order to analyze the relationships between countries and to test for 
contagion an asymmetric GARCH model is implemented. The paper takes a global 
perspective and analyzes 45 stock markets by arranging them in different groups for an 
easy and clear understanding. 
 
The results reveal that during the Global Financial Crisis the correlation coefficient 
between individual stock market indices and global stock index increased significantly, 
resulting in contagion at the level of the majority of the countries included in the 
analysis. Even though the crisis started locally, in just one country, it expanded very 
fast, translating its negative effects to other countries, regions, continents. Similar 
results are found when analyzing the correlation between individual stock market 
indices and global financials stock index. This suggests that the Global Financial Crisis 
originated in the financial sector and translated its effects to other sector and countries.  
An interesting phenomenon is registered at the level of Europe. The paper reveals that 
emerging Europe countries were affected more and in a bigger number than the 
developed countries. Similar results are found for the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
Emerging countries were affected more, their CDS spreads registering higher values 
than those of developed countries.  
 
After the crisis the situation tends to change. The co-movement between countries and 
global stock index tends to decrease in value and to loose in significance. However, 
when compared to the pre-crisis levels, markets register higher correlation coefficient, 
which suggests that the level of integration between countries continues to increase, that 
there may be some contagion left in the markets, and that the economies are struggling 
to recover. The same is true for European countries after the Sovereign Debt Crisis.  
 
This paper completes the previous literature by analyzing how the Global Financial 
Crisis and European Sovereign Debt Crisis changed the correlations between countries 
and which countries were affected the most. While previous literature focuses mainly on 
the period before and during the crisis this paper takes into account also the post-crisis 
period and its effects.  
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